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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the impact of potential closure of the sole tank production
facility in the United States, including the effects of closure on future tank production.
The analysis is based on the FY93 DOD budget which appropriated funds for upgrades
to existing MI Abrams tanks through 1995. Three possible alternatives to preserving the
tank industrial base are presented and analyzed with respect to applicable factors
currently facing decisionmakers in DOD, Congress and industry. The three alternatives
are: (1) terminate production upon completion of the initial upgrade in 1995, (2)
continue the upgrade from 1996 to 1999, or (3) slow down existing production rates to
stretch out production and minimize production stoppages. These alternatives are
analyzed utilizing factors such as workforce effects, costs, subcontractor base impact,
mobilization/surge impact, spare parts requirements, and operational effectiveness. The
thesis concludes with a recommendation on how to preserve the tank industrial base with
additional recommendations and areas requiring further study. The methodology utilized
here can be applied to other DOD systems and programs dependent on a single
manufacturer for systems facing a similar predicament. -____Accesion For
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the impact of the potential closure of the
only tank production facility in the United States. Additionally, three possible
alternatives to preserving the tank industrial base will be presented ane analyzed with
respect to applicable factors facing DOD, Congress and industry.
B. BACKGROUND
The tank industrial base is unique and essential to the readiness of the U.S. Army.
There is no commercial counterpart. The world is becoming more unstable and the need
for U.S. peacekeeping strength is greater than ever. To let the tank industrial base
whither due to an unclear industrial base plan is to compromise future readiness, tank
program options and U.S. resolve to support its allies. Congressional commitment to
preserve the tank industry for the near term by funding the first phase of the Abrams
tank upgrade signifies the necessary awareness to prepare for the next war. As Appius
Claudius the Blind stated before the Roman Senate, "if you value peace, be then prepared
for war." Without a functioning and proactive industrial base to support the standing
army, the stage for failure is set.
The Mi-series tank assembly line in Lima, Ohio, is currently the only open tank
factory in the U.S. The last MIAI tank for the U.S. Army rolled off the production line
in March 1993 and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) production will end in 1995. Congress
has approved upgrades of older model M Is to the M1A2 in the FY93 budget. The only
other tank assembly line at Detroit, Michigan, was closed in October 1991. As a result
of the current trend to downsize the military, it is possible that the tank plant at Lima,
Ohio, may remain idle from 1996 beyond 2000. The termination of the Block Hl tank
program in 1992 may lengthen this idle period if no follow-on tank is developed in the
near future or the second part of the M1 to M1A2 upgrade plan, due to take place from
1996 to 1999, is not funded.
As a result, General Dynamics, producer of the Ml tank, is trying to sell the M1
tank to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Canada and the United Arab Emirates and is
pushing DOD and Congress to continue retrofitting older MIs and M1Als to M1A2s in
order to keep the Lima plant open and preserve the tank industrial base.
Even these proposed alternatives may not keep the factory open long enough to
transition immediately into Block IlI or Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) production.
The U.S. Congress has directed that DOD retrofit older Mls to M1A2s in 1991, yet
DOD contested the upgrade plan by requesting a rescission of FY99 appropriations for
upgrades. Congress subsequently denied the rescission. Even with the funds
appropriated for the first 210 tanks, the Army will have a difficult time obtaining funds
to execute the remaining reconversion program.
Consequently, the debate between Congress and DOD is whether to: (1) shut down
the factory completely and mothball it until new production starts in the next century, (2)
slow down existing rates of production such that the factory will remain open until it is
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time to retool for Block III or FMBT production, or (3) keep the factory open to
continue conversion of early model M1 and MiAls into the M1A2 tank. The situation
facing DOD and Congress typifies some of the problems that affect industrial base
preparedness as the military shrinks in size and weapon systems acquisition is slowed
down or halted.
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this thesis are to provide the Army, DOD, and congressional
decisionmakers an insight into what should be done with the only open tank factory in
the United States. By using a case study format, a process to analyze this issue is
presented that can be applied to other programs dependent on a single manufacturer for
systems that are facing a similar predicament.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary
Upon completion of Abrams tank production in 1995, should DOD close the
only tank production facility in the United States, or keep it open until a new generation
tank is built?
2. Subsidiary
"* How will the absence of a U.S. tank production facility from 1996-2001 affect
future tank production, especially the Block III tank?
"* Will skilled workers be lost? Can they be replaced?
"* How will the FY93 DOD budget affect the tank production industrial base?
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"* What will it cost the Government to reopen the tank factory should the factory
close?
"* What will be the effect of plant closure on the subcontractor base?
"* How will spare parts requirements for the existing tank fleet be satisfied?
"* Under what conditions should DOD attempt to maintain a minimum tank
production capability for such circumstances as mobilization or foreign military
sales?
"* How will the Army deal with the existing fleet, along with other operational issues,
should it keep existing Mls and MIAls instead of buying the Block ill or M1A2
tank?
E. RESEARCH SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This case study focuses only on U.S. tank production and the effects of DOD
acquisition strategies and plans on a single source within the defense industrial base.
Since this issue continues to be debated between Congress, DOD, and industry and the
FY93 budget has partially preserved the tank industrial base through 1995, the scope of
this thesis will be limited to FY93 budget considerations.
F. METHODOLOGY
The thesis research and analysis first examines lessons learned from the defense and
tank industrial base during World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam and how the
industry handled declines in post-war weapon systems acquisition. The thesis then
develops three possible courses of action on methods proposed by decisionmakers to
sustain the tank industrial base. The effects of these three options are then analyzed with
respect to the following issues, 1) the tank industrial base workforce, 2) dollar costs
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required to implement each option, 3) effects on the subcontractor base, 4) impact on
mobilization requirements, and 5) operational effectiveness considerations. Finally,
conclusions and recommendations are presented with lessons learned that may be
applicable to systems facing a similar predicament in the years ahead.
G. LITERATURE REVIEW
Background and policy information was obtained from the Defense Technical
Information Center (DTIC)/Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE)
databases, professional journals, and published studies. Additional information was
obtained by corresponding with the Armor School, Program Executive Office (PEO)-
Armored Systems Modernization, and Program Manager (PM)-Abrams in the Tank
Automotive Command for current literature, technical data and newly published studies
on the subject. General Dynamics-Land Systems Division (GDLS), Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) and the General Accounting Office (GAO) were additional sources
for technical data. Additional assistance was received from the Institute of Land Warfare
at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), from the American Defense




A. THE INDUSTRIAL BASE
The economic and political situation facing the tank industrial base iflects
problems that have permeated throughout the history of the U.S. defense industrial base
since World War I. A combination of governmental efforts to coordinate industrial base
policy and industry's effort to provide those products required for the nation's defense
has resulted in many successes and just as many failures.
In a 1988 industrial base study published by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), the industrial base is defined as the "aggregate ability to
provide the manufacturing, production, technology, research and development, and
resources required to produce materials for the common defense of the U.S."I Some
of the implicit assumptions in this definition are that any firnm that provides goods for
national defense, whether commercially owned/operated, Government owned/operated,
or domestic or foreign based is part of the industrial base. Also incorporated into this
definition is the belief that the U.S. defense industrial base contributes to deterrence
strategy in three ways: peacetime efficiency, technological competitiveness, and
flexibility in a crisis. This contribution to deterrence assumes "that peace will be the
'James Blackwell, Deterrence in Decay: The Future of the U.S. Defense Industrial
Base, The final report of the CSIS Defense Industrial Base Project, Washington, D.C.:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 1989, p. 12.
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normal state of U.S. relations and that peace will be sustained by demonstrated readiness
and willingness to fight to protect national interests." 2
Additionally, the defense industrial base provides the military technologically
superior materiel in order to overcome the disadvantage in being outnumbered as was
typified by the U.S. military posture in Europe during the Cold War and more recently
Desert Shield/Storm. Because deterrence may not always preserve the peace and because
there is risk that low-level threats may bring the U.S. into conflict, the defense industrial
base has to retain some flexibility to convert from peacetime research and
development/production to wartime readiness requiring a short-term surge, long-term
expansion, or postwar recovery.
B. THE TANK INDUSTRIAL BASE, 1917-1945
1. 1917-1940
The U.S. entered World War I in mid-1917 unprepared for a major world
war. It had not foreseen the requirements that would be placed on the industrial base and
as a result, it was in 1917 that the Government made the decision to manufacture a
modified version of the French Renault light tank and components for the British Mark
VIII heavy tank (the British Mark VIII would be partially manufactured in the U.S. with
final assembly to occur in France). Large-scale production was planned for a small 3-ton
tank and a larger tank with Ford Motor Company. Work was in progress on 23,405
tanks in the U.S. by November 1918. Because of the long lead time required to build
2Blackwell, p. 13.
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tanks, emerging new technologies, and the late mobilization of industry to a wartime
posture, only 952 Renault light tanks, 100 Mark VIIIs and fifteen Ford 3-ton tanks were
actually produced with none ever committed to combat in France.
In 1921, the Medium A tank program was initiated with similar models of
tanks following in 1922 and 1925. The Medium A was followed by the Medium T2 in
1930 under the direction of Walter Christie. The T2 incorporated the innovative Christie
suspension system and attained a top speed of 42.5 miles per hour, twice the speed of
the Medium A tank. Soon afterwards, the Ordnance Department developed the 11-ton
Medium T4 tank but because of the Depression, few tanks were purchased by the Army.
As a result of the Depression and a small army dominated by horse cavalry advocates,
the total number of tanks in the inventory stood at 464 as of May 1, 1940, or the total
production since 1935. In the meantime, 1938-1940 saw newer designs culminating in
the Medium T6 tank, subsequently redesignated the M4 Sherman and mass produced
from July 1940 until the end of the war.
2. 1940-1945
World ,oar II saw the establishment of the tank industrial base as U.S.
industry met the challenge of fighting a two-front war. In sum, the defense portion of
the Gross National Product (GNP) went from two to forty percent (the defense portion
of GNP today is between five and six percent). Total tank production in World War II
was 88,410 tanks. Seventeen factories in the U.S. produced tanks from 1940-1945 that
included light, medium, and heavy tanks. Tank production by year was as follows:
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TABLE I









C. THE TANK INDUSTRIAL BASE, 1945-1980
1. The Korean War
When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the U.S. was slightly better
prepared than it had been for World Wars I and II. "It had retained a production base
theoretically capable of supporting the force. However, due to inadequate funding of
defense needs, the Army.. .was in a poor readiness state."3
The private sector had operated a defense industry that had developed and
sustained post-World War II production requirements. Aiding their survival, production
for the Korean War was built out of World War II facilities that either had continued to
operate or could be rapidly reopened because the previous war had recently ended. In
3LTC David T. Bullock, U.S. Army, "Can The United States Industrial Base
Respond Adequately To the Need For Rapid Tank Production During Full Mobilization?"
Executive Research Project S13, Fort McNair, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, 1988, p. 4.
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addition, the tank industrial base was being sustained by World War IH mobilization
planning, but in reality, the Army-owned tank plants were in a poor readiness state.
The Army existed in a budget constrained environment prior to the Korean
War and had no money for new procurement to include tanks. For other than
procurement items, the Army computed its requirements basing its calculations on bare
essentials. But it still typically found the final appropriation well below its budget
request. For example, the Ordnance Department's FY48 budget request estimated an
Army budget of $750 million to procure essential ammunition and equipment, storage
and distribution of ordnance material, maintenance of standby plants and arsenals,
training, and research and development. The Bureau of the Budget cut the request to
$275 million, with Congress appropriating $246 million. As a result, the armor force
was critically lacking in new tanks at the initiation of hostilities and no new tanks were
expected for fielding until 1952.
The armor force at the beginning of the Korean War stood as follows:
TABLE II
THE ARMOR FORCE IN 1950
Tanks On Hand Type
900 Serviceable M24 Chaffee light tanks
2557 Unserviceable M24 Chaffee light tanks
1826 Serviceable M4A3 Sherman medium tanks
1376 Unserviceable M4A3 Sherman medium tanks
319 Serviceable M24 Patton heavy tanks
Source: AUSA Background Brief No. 40.
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In sum, development of Army weapons and combat vehicles continued at a
decelerated rate, while no funds were made available for improvements to existing
systems.' In the Far East Command, MacArthur's forces had not had their tanks
replaced since 1945 and they possessed no medium tanks in their inventory. As a result,
even though U.S. technology was the best in the world, it remained on the drawing board
and in the laboratories. The outbreak of hostilities resulted in disaster for U.S. tanks as
they were easily outmatched by the better Soviet-equipped North Korean tanks.
2. 1950-1973
In a report to the National Security Council (NSC) published on 14 April
1950, NSC-68 concluded that if unchecked, the Soviet Union would attempt to control
Europe. Consequently, NSC-68 provided an "intellectual rationale for the creation of a
state of operational and mobilization readiness aimed at thwarting the Soviet Union."
5
This document became the basis for passage of the Defense Production Act (DPA) of
1950. The combination of lessons learned from the Korean War and the U.S.'s role as
the world's policeman in the Cold War, now gave the Government the ability to
formalize guidance to industry and DOD through the DPA not only in war, but in peace
as well.
4Association of the United States Army, The U.S. Army Between World War 11 and
the Korean War, Arlington, VA: AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, Background Brief
No. 40, March 1992, p. 5.
5Roderick L. Vawter, Industrial Mobilization: The Relevant History, Fort McNair,
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983, p. 42.
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The DPA was the only significant legislation governing the industrial base.
Its fundamental purposes were to (1) provide mobilization capability that would be
required in war, (2) provide authority to assign priorities to Government contracts, and
(3) allocate materials and facilities for national defense. The Department of Commerce
had statutory responsibility for the DPA, with authority further delegated to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). From the 1950s until recently, the DPA and
provisions of the Defense Authorization Act were the only legislation governing the
industrial base. These laws came under conflicting jurisdiction in Congress with the
Authorization Act coming under House and Senate Armed Services Committee
jurisdiction and the DPA coming under Senate and House Banking Committee
jurisdiction. This led to an ineffective and uncoordinated industrial base policy that
lasted forty-three years.
Additionally, OSD provided guidance to industry in order to perpetuate the
defense industrial base and prepare the nation for mobilization. It was issued in the
following format.
a. Preferential Planning List
The Preferential Planning List (PPL) identified key end items essential
to national survival and was prepared by DOD. Also known as the Thousand Items List,
the Services were directed to identify key end items for which detailed mobilization
planning would be executed. This list kept key items down to manageable numbers and
provided for planning in-depth for major items. The approval authority to place items
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on the list came from DOD. To mai.ain this list, the Services and industry were forced
to keep open communications and identify mobilization priorities in the industrial base.
b. Production Allocation Program
The Production Allocation Program (PAP) gave every essential
manufacturer of military items and equipment the details in advance of mobilization on
what to produce, for whom, and how much tv produce. It also told the Services the
source for specific items. The PAP was designed to reduce interservice rivalries for
production capacity at a single plant. Plant usage under wartime conditions and military
mobilization production schedules was established by a team consisting of an Armed
Services Procurement Planning Officer (ASPPO) and plant representative.
c. Industrial Defense Program
The Industrial Defense Program (IDP) provided for the development of
a list of critical facilities, such as factories, bridges, and power generating stations,
necessary for production and delivery of essential military items. Also known as the Key
Facilities List (KFL), it became the basis for planning industrial defense against both a
threat and natural disasters. Each Service was assigned responsibility for certain facilities
on the KFL.
d. Industrial Preparedness Measures Program
The Industrial Preparedness Measures Program (IPMP) was aimed at
identifying and eliminating mobilization and production bottlenecks before the emergency
actually occurred. It was implemented by contracts between Government and industry
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that ranged from a simple study to funding for new production processes. This program
covered nearly all aspects of industril mobilization planning activities.
e. Priorities and Allocation Program
The Piiorities and Allocation Program expected to minimize costly delays
in rapid conversion to military production at mobilization day. It was authorized by the
DPA and was to be continued without an interruption until mobilization day was
declared.
All of these programs intended to prepare the nation for war with the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact. Yet they were never fully executed and even as the nation
went to war in Vietnam, production was never mobilized; however, a steadily growing
flow of defense dollars permitted a market response to the increased defense demands of
that conflict.6 Because the Vietnam War gave industry a lead time to react, rigid
wartime controls and a mobilization effort were unnecessary. However, war material
procurement competed with peacetime commercial production, causing shortages of some
items. Because Vietnam was not a war that required large numbers of tanks due to the
nature of the warfare, tank production remained at peacetime levels. The decisions made




3. The 1973 Yom Kippur War
During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the U.S. discovered its inability to
support the quick and lethal warfare that typified the ten-day October 1973 War in the
Middle East. Israeli tank losses were unpredictably high in short but extremely violent
armored warfare. The U.S. was forced to provide over 1000 M60 tanks to Israel from
war reserves in Europe and the active inventory, because the tank industry was unable
to produce the requisite number of tanks in time.
Only two factors prevented the Arab coalition from achieving a tactical
victory against the Israelis. First, the Israelis were able to repair and rearm 800 tanks
during the war and second, the massive airlift of American tanks from the U.S. and
Europe provided desperately needed armor to the Golan and Sinai fronts. As a result of
the war, DOD directed Chrysler to increase production from 30 to over 100 tanks a
month to replace losses from the war and restock the Army's inventory. But Chrysler
discovered that it would only be able to increase production up to 40 tanks a month due
to the limited supply of tank hull and turret castings from commercial foundries. At that
time, there were only four foundries in the U.S. that could produce castings for the M60
tank.
Interestingly, this same problem had been identified by Government and
industry as early as 1950. Of those four foundries, only two agreed to help DOD
reconstitute the armor inventory and the Government agreed to fund capital investment
to the two foundries to expand production of tank castings. Unforeseen by Chrysler, the
EPA had recently placed an additional burden on the foundries to meet clean air
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standards further delaying production. In the end, "it took five years to increase M60A1
production from 30 to 120 per month after the 1973 Middle East War."7 The lesson
learned from the October 1973 War was that increases in tank production would take
several years to achieve and that the tank industrial base was incapable of producing
large amounts of tanks on short notice.
This lesson was again repeated in 1976 when the decision was made to
produce the MI tank. In this instance, the Army had mothballed the Lima Army Tank
Plant (LATP) in Lima, Ohio from 1959 to 1976. Consequently, by the time Chrysler
had prepared LATP for tank production, four years had elapsed from the time the Army
had made its announcement to produce the M1 to the time that the first M1 rolled off the
assembly line.
D. THE M1 ABRAMS TANK PROGRAM
General Dynamics Land Systems Division (GDLS), has been the prime contractor
for the MI since 1976 when the Secretary of the Army selected then Chrysler
Corporation's Chrysler Defense Corporation XM1 prototype for full scale engineering
development (General Dynamics acquired Chrysler's tank production capability in 1982).
A three-year contract was awarded to Chrysler for $196.2 mi "ion. The first MI was
completed in 1980 at LATP. Detroit Army Tank Plant (DATP) in Detroit, Michigan
began production of the M1 in 1982. During the next three years, 2,374 Ml tanks were
7BG(Ret) Philip L. Bolte, "Tank Industrial Base Issues," Personal letter to the
researcher, 10 July 1992.
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produced at both plants. Production of the basic M1 with a 105mm gun concluded in
February 1985; the M1 Improved Product (M1IP) was produced from February 1985 to
1988 for a total production run of 894 tanks. In 1988, production of the M1Al tank with
a 120mm gun began (Figure 1). Further improvements for the MIAl tank were
announced in 1988 consisting of improved armor that incorporated steel encased depleted
uranium (DU), which was twice as dense as steel. A total of 4,802 MIAl tanks were
produced, with the latter production models containing DU armor.
Figure I MIAl Abrams Tank
Source: GDLS.
GDLS has been responsible for incorporating a number of important improvements
manufactured by subcontractors and by component producers during the Abrams'
production run. The Army's plan for the Ml calls for adding on improvements through
block improvements. The initial improvement consisted of improved (Chobham) qrmor.
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The second major block improvement included the 120mm main gun fielded in December
1986. The third improvement for the MI tank, the Block 11 tank, was designed to
counter the Future Soviet Tank Two (FST2).
IMPROVED COMMANDERS COMMANDER'S INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR GUNNERS
WEAPON STATION (ICWSI THERMAL VIEWER (CITV) PRIMARY SIGHT
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Figure 2 M1A2 Abrams Tank
Source: GDLS.
The Block II tank, better known as the MIA2, incorporates major redesigns to its
interior and includes a commander's independent thermal viewer, commander's integrated
display, position/navigational unit, driver's thermal viewer and an improved gunner's
primary sight. The evolution of the MI tank, through the M1IP, MIAI and the M1A2
is documented in Appendix A.
As of January 1993, Ml tank production stood as follows:
* The last MiAl will be delivered to the U.S. Army in March 1993.
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0 A total of 62 M1A2s will be produced for the U.S. Army by 1993.
* Congress has appropriated FY93 funds to upgrade 210 MI 105mm tanks to the
M1A2 from 1993-1995.
* 550 MIAI tanks will be coproduced with the Egyptiani Government.
0 700 M1A2 tanks are scheduled for sale to Saudi Arabia.
* 760 M1A2 tanks are scheduled for sale to Kuwait.
The follow-on to the M1A2 has been designated the Block MI tank and is part of
the Army's Armored Systems Modernization Program (ASM).
E. THE ASM PROGRAM
The ASM concept, initiated in 1980, called for the d,.,,elopment of a common
chassis for a total of seven heavy and medium armored vehicles as a cost reduction
measure. Four of the vehicles: the Block II tank, the Combat Mobility Vehicle (CMV),
the Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS), and Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle
(FIFV), share a common heavy chassis (Figure 3). The Line-of-Sight Antitank vehicle
(LOSAT) and Future Armored Resupply Vehicle-Ammunition (FARV-A), share a
common medium chassis (Figure 4). The last vehicle is the Armored Gun System (AGS)
and it has been developed on a light chassis. Program cost for the ASM program in
1991 was $59 billion, not including the AGS.
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Source: GAO.
Army planning from the close of World War U emphasized the need for combat
systems designed to fight against a numerically superior enemy with superior technology.
This planning was used by the Army to justify the ASM program. But the breakup of
the Warsaw Pact and subsequently the Soviet Union forced DOD and Congress to review
the ASM program. The Army, in its revised threat assessment report to justify its
mission needs for ASM, did not recognize the diminished Soviet threat in its justification
for the ASM program as late as June 1991.
However, a July 1991 Congressional GAO report called the need for the Block InI
tank into question. It stated that,
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The Army continues to view the Block Hm tank as its top priority, even though
a projected delay in the fielding of the Future Soviet Tank Three (FST3)-the Soviet
Union's future main battle tank, which the Block III will be designed to defeat-
appears to make its requirement less urgent. This delay pushes the expected
fielding to the middle of the next decade.8
The GAO stated in its findings that:
"* The Army had not reassessed the need for the ASM program.
"* The affordability of the ASM program was questionable.
"* The ASM program priorities were inconsistent with the threat.
It further recommended that:
"* The Secretary of Defense reassess the ASM program's justification, affordability,
and priorities in light of the significant threat changes, projected Army-wide
funding shortfalls and the greater need for ASM vehicles other than the Block MI
tank.
"* It also stated that if the 1992 tests demonstrated the viability of electrothermal gun
technology, that the Secretary of Defense should direct the Army to evaluate using
this technology to upgrade the MI/M1A2 fleet, thereby reducing the need for the
Block III tank.
"* Finally, GAO stated that Congress should cease additional funding for the ASM
program without an accompanying DOD reassessment of the justification and
affordability of the ASM program anc the priority of the vehicles within the
program.
The FY93 Budget request to Congress reflected the recommendations found in this
GAO report and as a result, the ASM program was reorganized and the Block III tank
8U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Defense, U.S. Senate, ASM: Program Inconsistent with Current Threat and Budgetary
Constraints, GAO Report GAO/NSIAD-91-254, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1991, p. 3.
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canceled. The Army's FY93 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation budget
request reflects this threat reassessment and outlines a revised ASM program:
The program as outlined last year has been restructured significantly. The
Block III tank, the Combat Mobility Vehicle and the Future Infantry Vehicle have
been deferred indefinitely. The Line-of-Sight Antitank Vehicle weapon system will
not go into production as previously planned and will continue in development as
a prototype program. The restructured program now gives priority to the
Advanced Field Artillery System and the Future Armored Resupply Vehicle-
Ammunition.9
Current trends indicate that the future of the ASM program appears bleak. In sum,
it is unlikely that the Block III tank will be fielded within the next twenty years and in
light of the repeated cutbacks in ASM funding during the last months of FY92, the
program appears nearly terminated.
F. THE FY93 BUDGET
1. The Army Budget Request to Congress
The Army obtains funding for its armored vehicles through two program
elements. The first falls under Title III: Procurement, (Weapons and Tracked Combat
Vehicles). The second falls under Title IV: Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation, (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Army).
a. Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles
The Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles (WTCV) falls under the
procurement appropriation and encompasses tracked combat vehicles and weapons and
9Association of the United States Army, Army Budget, Fiscal Year 1993: An
Analysis, Arlington, VA: AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, May 1992, p. 46.
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other tracked vehicles. Fiscal year 1991 was the last contract for U.S. procurement,
with the final new tank delivery due in March 1993. The WTCV appropriation dropped
from $1,111,096,000 in FY92 to $921,389,000 in FY93.'0
b. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
The Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
appropriation incorporates the resources of Army research, development, test and
evaluation involved in the development of weapons and equipment. The RDT&E budget
for the Army dropped, in current dollars, from $6,563,000,000 in FY92 to
$6,032,860,000 in FY93. 11
2. ASM/M1 Budget Status
Overall funding trends for armor vehicle procurement is downward similar
to the overall defense budget decline. Except for the AGS, armor programs are steadily
losing what few budget dollars they have remaining.
a. ASM
The ASM program rose, in current dollars, from $299.8 million in FY92
to $332.3 million in FY93 with initial procurement of the AGS to take place during this
"°U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Making Appropriations For The
Department of Defense For The Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1993, And For Other
Purposes, Conference Report 102-1015 to Accompany H.R. 5504, 102nd Congress, 2nd
Session, 05 October 1992, p. 88.
"FY93 Conference Report, p. 120.
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time."2 The initial procurement for the AGS is primarily for tooling. As stated earlier,
the Block III was deferred indefinitely with emphasis placed on the AFAS and the
FARV-A.
b. M1 Abrams
Congress approved the Army's budget request for MI tank program
management and fielding and the MI tank modifications for the FY93 appropriation
(Table III). In addition, the House and Senate both agreed to fund the upgrade of older
M1 tanks to the M1A2 since "no replacement tank program is contemplated for at least
15 years, the United States will lose the existing tank manufacturing industrial base
unless action is taken to maintain it.'' 13 For this reason, the Congress denied the
Army's request to rescind the $225 million appropriated in FY92 for the upgrade
program.
The conferees believe the M1 upgrade program as proposed by Congress is
consistent with the aims of the Department's new acquisition strategy. Over 40
percent of the existing MI inventory is comprised of early models which lack the
120mm cannon, heavy armor package, chemical warfare protection, and other
improvements found in the newer versions. As is well known, the Army chose to
replace first generation tanks with more modem 120mm tanks before the ground
war began in Operation Desert Storm.
Moving forward with an upgrade program would increase the overall operational
effectiveness of our tank inventory at reasonable cost while preserving the critical
skills which are unique to main battle tank production. Given the demise of the
Block III tank program, the conferees believe the need for an MI tank upgrade
"
2U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Deparrment of Defense Appropriations
Bill, 1993, Report 102-627 to Accompany H.R. 5504, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 29
June 1992, p. 160.
'
3FY93 House Appropriations Bill, p. 87.
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program has clearly increased. Therefore, the conferees reject the proposal to
rescind the $225,000,000 slated for the tank upgrade program.' 4
Additionally, it denied the Army from upgrading MiAls to the M1A2
and included a general provision in the FY93 House Appropriation (Section 9114) which
prohibited the use of funds from any tank upgrade program which did not start with the
105mm M1 tank. This upgrade plan continues to be a major source of conflict between
DOD and Congress. The final M1 procurement appropriation is contained in Table III.
TABLE I
M1 ABRAMS BUDGET TRENDS
Fiscal Year 1992 Fiscal Year 1993
Quantity/$ millions Quantity/$ millions
M1 Abrams 18/106.6 *0/32.4
M1 Abrams mods 0/79.3 **0/25.2
Total 18/185.9 0/57.6
*Annualized support costs.
"**Modification kits for older tanks.
Source: FY93 Conference Report.
Congress has provided funding to retrofit Mls to the MIA2, but new
tank production should end by March 1993.
3. The FY93 Appropriation
Congress appropriated $161 million to upgrade the oldest MI tanks to the
M1A2. In addition, with the $197.4 million obtained from the sale of tanks in the Army
inventory in FY91/92 and the $225 million appropriated in FY92, the way is clear for
14FY93 House Appropriations Bill, p. 86.
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at least the 1992-1995 time frame, for the retrofit of 210 Mls to the MIA2.15 The tank
industrial base in the near-term seems secure, although the challenge will be to secure
the additional three billion dollars required to retrofit the 792 M-Is to the M1A2.
Regardless of what occurs, FY94 will emerge with continued debate on the
posture of the tank industrial base. Additionally, in FY94, the defense budget will no
longer be protected from the budget fences specified in the 1990 Budget Enforcement
Act. Therefore, there will be those in Congress who will want to divert defense funds
to domestic and international programs. The likelihood of this happening is high, with
the long-term detrimental effects of such a strategy not being felt for many years or until
the next conflict.
G. ACQUISITION STRATEGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE POLICY TODAY
1. DOD/Army Acquisition Strategy
In February 1992, as the U.S. Army continued the drawdown that began with
the breakup of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the Secretary of Defense publicly
stated that the DOD acquisition focus would retain an emphasis on research and
development because technology was the key to keeping casualties low and winning
battles, as evidenced in Desert Storm. He continued to say that a higher reliance would
be placed on upgrades and technology insertions in existing platforms followed by full
scale production after a thorough test and evaluation period.
'
5FY93 Conference Report, p. 89.
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The Secretary of the Army's acquisition strategy follows the logic at the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level by stating:
Defense acquisition in the future will be characterized by (1) fewer new system
development and production programs, (2) greater reliance on technology insertion
through upgrades of existing systems to avoid tactical, logistical and technical
obsolescence, and (3) greater use of Advanced Technology Demonstrations
(ATDs), the "show me" phase of our science and technology (S&T) program, to
validate the maturity and utility of advanced technologies and thereby reduce risk
in future acquisition programs."6
The upgrades described by the Army Acquisition Executive are system/block
upgrades and technology insertion programs. Examples of this in the tank procurement
arena ar• the M1A2/Block II tank and electrothermal gun technology respectively.
This policy will make it more difficult to justify the procurement of new
weapon systems. The FY93 DOD procurement budget reflects the new policy by the
reduction of new weapon systems purchases and emphasis on upgrades. To commit to
a new weapon system, the following criteria will have to be met:
"* A clear and verified military need exists.
"* The technologies have to be demonstrated, thoroughly tested, and successfully
proven for production.
"* The production program is cost effective."7
The Army's overall acquisition strategy goals can be further subdivided into
three areas; modernization strategy, resource allocation strategy, and acquisition strategy.
"
6Stephen K. Conver, "From The Army Acquisition Executive," Army Research,
Development & Acquisition Bulletin, July-August 1992, p. 57.
17Conver, RD&A Bulletin, p. 57.
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a. Modernization Strategy
The modernization strategy focuses on long-term technology that creates
overmatching capabilities against a projected threat. Formerly, this threat had been the
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Now it comprises a number of regional threats with
varying capabilities. This strategy chooses to eliminate technological surprises from a
potential enemy by requiring continuous m: demization. At the same time, this strategy
has considered the risks of delaying modernization as a near-term economic measure
e.g., the Army's decision to terminate MIA1 production in order to shift funds to the
Block III tank resulted in both the MIAI and Block IEl being canceled.
A successful modernization strategy should imply that sufficient funding
has to be provided to get ideas out of the laboratories and into the user's hands. In
reality, the most recent defense budgets reflect a decrease in funds. Modernization
strategies are linked to the industrial base through the technological capabilities found at
laboratories, factories, and other research and development establishments. They must
be protected to preserve the options to modernize in the long-term.
b. Resource Allocation Strategy
"This strategy involves funding both the procurement and research and
development (R&D) accounts. The Army Senior Acquisition Executive (SAE) stated that
the procurement to R&D expenditures ratio has historically ranged between 2.0:1.0 and
3.0:1.0 over the past three decades with an average of 2.5:1.0. That is, $2.50 in
procurement is spent for every dollar invested in R&D. For a solid long-term program,
the procurement to R&D ratio should be no lower than 2:1. Currently, it stands at
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1.25:1 and could go to 1:1 or less in the future."8 This is due to the new emphasis on
technology and DOD's inability to fund large numbers of new production programs.
Again, the resource allocation strategy calls for funding programs that
satisfy a strong user need, are executable, and can be approved by OSD and Congress.
Savings from Operation and Maintenance accounts, or those savings generated by retiring
obsolete equipment and fielding more efficient equipment are permitted to be put back
into procurement of replacement equipment. The Army proposed retiring older M I and
5000 M60 tanks to generate savings from the Operation and Maintenance account in
order to fund future tank purchases or the MI to MIA2 retrofit.
c. Acquisition Strategy
The overall guidance provided by DOD to the Services and the Army is
to develop a tailored acquisition strategy for each specific program. Formal procedures
are contained in DOD Directive 5000.1, Defense Acquisition, which establishes "a
disciplined management approach for acquiring systems and materiel that satisfy the
operational user's needs." Additionally, DOD Instruction 5000.2, Defense Acquisition
Management Policies and Procedures, outlines the framework for translating the mission
need into,
"
8Stephen K. Conver, "Shaping the Defense Industrial Base of the Future," Office
of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition,
Draft working paper, 1992, p. 3.
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... stable affordable acquisition programs that meet the operational user's needs
and can be sustained, given projected resource constraints; and a rigorous event-
oriented management process for acquiring quality products .... .
The instruction also places an emphasis on acquisition planning,
improved communications with the users, and stresses risk management from all players
in the process. The Army's acquisition strategy is merely a reflection of DOD
acquisition strategy.
2. Industrial Base Policy
a. DOD Policy
Critics have described recent industrial base policy as "uncoordinated,
incoherent, and ill-conceived." 2" Current DOD policy towards preserving the industrial
base is to essentially let market forces do the work. Some DOD industrial base
assumptions, based on recent decisions at the OSD level are that:
* Whatever remaining industrial capacity survives during the drawdown is enough
to meet future needs.
9 Whenever funds become available, industry can quickly respond to rebuild
production capacity.
* Defense industries can become commercially viable entities in the hiatus between
DOD contract termination and future starts.21
'
9DOD, USD(A), Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Defense Acquisition
Management Policies and Procedures, 23 February 1991.
2 0Blackwell, p. 14.
"
2tDon Yockey, "Defense Acquisition," Memorandum from the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, 20 May 1992.
30
Recent comments by the Deputy Secretary of Defense reaffirm the above
assumptions since he believes that "future wars will be deterred, end quickly, or be
preceded by so much warning that there will be plenty of time for reconstitution.""2
He bases his rationale on dual-use technologies, promotion of civil-military integration,
and applications of procedures consistent with commercial practices coupled with a free
market economy.
With respect to the tank industrial base, the Under Secretary of Defense
specifically stated in his acquisition memorandum to the Services and before Congress
that "there are enough tanks available now to meet any perceived contingency, and there
is enough time to rec-.)nstitute the tank industrial base if a global threat emerges.
Therefore, tank production will cease as planned. "'
The overall philosophy of DOD, thus far, has been not to interfere with
the operation of the free market with regard to the industrial base. This policy stance
has caused contractors to leave the defense business permanently over the last several
years. It may save dollars in the short-term but the long-term implications for industrial
base preservation could be devastating.
b. Contractor/Industry Policy
The industries that make up the industrial base face great uncertainty
about the future. Therefore, there are few insights on what production should be
"J2 john W. McDonald, U.S. Defense Industrial Base Preparedness, Arlington, VA:
Association of the United States Army Landpower Essay No. 92-1, February 1992.
"Y3yockey, 20 May 92.
31
~- - - L
maintained for each sector of the defense industrial base. There also exists a glut of
capital equipment and production capacity due to the defense buildup of the 1980s.
Maintenance and costs to hold on to these facilities are enormous. The uncertainty due
to a lack of coherent national industrial base policy is causing industry to exhibit
reluctance in making capital investments for modernization in future DOD contracts.
Options for foreign military sales are made difficult by competition from government-
backed European and Pacific nation consortiums along with a lack of Government
support and bureaucratic obstacles here in the U.S.
Additionally, the problems generated by the declining defense budget are
exacerbated by the regulations and practices associated with doing business with DOD.
Furthermore, "these practices increase the cost of military systems by adding as much
as 25 to 50 percent to unit costs and procurement time."' Adopting commercial
standards through actions such as converting military specifications to non-governmental
standards, adopting European vendor standards (ISO 9000) for supplier accreditation and
adopting Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) standards, are some of the ways that
have been suggested to reduce costly reviews and audits mandated by current
Government regulations ard reduce overhead and duplication of effort.
24U.S. Congress, Structure of the Industrial Base Panel of the Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, Future of the Defense Industrial Base, Report No.
10, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 07 April 1992, p. 13.
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(1) Technical Data Rights. Technical Data Rights continue to sour
relations between Government and the tank industry ultimately stifling research,
development and innovation. Industry leaders would like to see the balance of technical
data rights being shifted from the Government back to the industry.
(2) Cost Accounting Standards. Government Cost "ccounting
Standards add excess overhead to companies doing business with the Government. These
obstacles force contractors to establish additional administrative structures to handle
Government unique requirements further discouraging business with DOD and ultimately
erodes the defense industrial base.
(3) Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The FAR does not allow
contractors to use Government-owned equipment and tooling left in their facilities during
DOD contract breaks for commercial ventures. Critics of these regulations believe
allowing contractors to utilize Government-owned equipment during DOD contract
production breaks will promote dual-use technologies and most importantly, reduce idle
manufacturing time.
H. OTHER INDUSTRIAL BASE ISSUES
The following areas have been suggested as possible alternatives for maintaining
a viable indus', ", base for the future. Although these are programs generally in the
conceptual stagts, they have the potential for expanding the options for preserving the
tank industrial base. These areas could affect the way DOD, congressional and industry
decisionmakers approach industrial base issues in the future.
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1. Conversion
Congress has recently addressed the issue of defense conversion in the context
of a broad plan for the national economy and the structure of the nation's defense.2 5
This is generally addressed in the context of finding training and employment for workers
displaced by reductions in the defense industrial base. Defense companies have not been
successful in moving from the controlled and specialized environment of defense
acquisition to the commercial sector unless they are engaged both in defense and
commercial ventures. If segments of the tank industrial base undergo conversion in the
future, elements of the tank industrial base must be able to successfully transition from
the defense sector to the commercial sector. If so, they must also be willing and capable
to return to tank production and component manufacture when needed.
2. Reconstitution
The debate on reconstitution centers on whether defense industries can
reconstitute themselves after a major downsizing. Since the tank industrial base, along
with the defense sector in general, is still undergoing restructuring as part of the defense
drawdown, data are still lacking to assess this issue from a restructured tank industrial
base.
3. Dual-Use Technology
The dual-use technology concept for both military and civilian applications
is a potentially viable option for preserving the tank industrial base, especially in
25U.S. Congress, Future of the Defense Industrial Base, p. 4.
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electronics/optics and propulsion systems. However, military specifications and military
standards requirements must be overcome to make dual-use technologies affordable.
4. Flexible Manufacturing
There is potential, with the application of computer integrated flexible
manufacturing, to produce multiple systems and preserve the manufacturing base at
LATP. Flexible manufacturing processes can be adapted to produce more than one type
of item on an assembly line. This makes the production of a smaller number or each
type of item more efficient and reduces reliance on economies of scale. For tank
production, there is potential for employing flexible manufacturing processes at LATP.
5. Foreign Investment in U.S. Tank Production Capabilities
In the past, there has been concern for the level of investment of U.S.
defense firms by foreign entities. Roadwheel production is already controlled by an
Israeli corporation and Allison Transmission Division (ATD), the Abrams transmission
manufacturer, was sold to a German corporation in January 1993. These two examples
seem to show that the level of foreign investment in U.S. tank production is not a major
concern to decisionmakers. Furthermore, it appears that governmental regulations
monitoring foreign investment in U.S. defense firms are not being enforced."b
Increasing levels of investment by foreign firms does not necessarily make
U.S. defense industry vulnerable to foreign dependency. In fact, it may be an alternative
for preserving the tank industrial oase if closely monitored by the Government.
"
26Michael Sperling, "U.S. Congressman Questions GM Sale," Defense News, 11-17
January 1993, p. 25.
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In sum, greater investment by foreign firms in U.S. defense production is
increasing and a clear policy governing foreign ownership is not in place or being
enforced so that industry can maintain future production capability.
6. Original Equipment Manufacturers and Army Depots
This issue involves the teardown of older tanks in preparation for
remanufacture to the MIA2. Teardown can be conducted by the Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) or at Army depots. The tradeoff between OEM and depot arises
because if all work is done at OEM, then the industrial base is preserved through an
ongoing reconversion/teardown program. Meanwhile, the depots remain underutilized
and could eventually be closed, eliminating any future capability for tank overhauls and
major maintenance. On the opposite end of the spectrum, allocating all work to depot
activities utilizes ir . depots to maximum capability but takes away work from the OEM,
eroding the tank industrial base in the long-term.
This issue will most likely be resolved now that depots are being required to
compete for work against civilian contractors through full and open competition. The
source selection process will result in selection of an OEM or depot activity that can
provide the best value to the Government.
I. CURRENT STATE AND STRUCTURE OF THE TANK INDUSTRY
The tank industrial base has evolved into a complex structure involving several
thousand contractors, subcontractors and second- and third-tier subcontractors.
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1. Components of the Tank Industrial Base
The Abrams tank requires one prime contractor and five major
subcontractors, broken down by the following management/system engineering
classifications or industrial segments:
"* Prime Contractor.
"* Electronic and optical component manufacturers.
"* Complex mchining operations.
"* Propulsion system manufacturers: engine and transmission.
"* Basic material manufacturers: steel and depleted uranium.
"* Weapon manufacturers: 120mm cannon and mount.
Production of the Abrams tank is accomplished by GDLS, which operates one
plant assembly facility at LATP, a complex machining facility in Scranton, Pennsylvania
and an electronics/optical facility in Sterling Heights, Michigan. Primary propulsion
production is managed by Textron Lycoming which operates the Stratford Army Engine
Plant (SAEP) in Stratford, Connecticut. Allison Corporation manufactures the
transmission for the Abrams at the Allison Transmission Division (ATD) in Indianapolis,
Indiana. Basic materials consists of large cast steel, armored steel plate, and depleted
uranium production. Only two major producers, Atchison Casting Corporation in
Atchison, Kansas, along with the newly reopened Birdsboro foundry in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania are capable of producing large castings for the Abrams. The 120mm gun
and mount are produced at Watervliet and Rock Island Arsenals. Table IV presents the
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number of key manufacturers and suppliers for the Abrams tank.27 A description and
analysis of tank subcontractors by industrial segment is contained in Chapter V.
TABLE IV
M1 ABRAMS INDUSTRIAL BASE







2. Specialized Equipment Requirements for the Abrams Tank
The Abrams tank is a complex piece of equipment employing many scientific
disciplines and difficult manufacturing processes. Therefore, Abrams tank proguction
requires a number of unique processes and specialized equipment such as special armor
and depleted uranium production. However, some of the equipment and technologies
associated with the equipment may be used in the manufacture of other industrial
products. Likewise, some commercial technologies and processes may be transferred
from other manufacturing uses to Abrams production. But transfer of such equipment
from other uses to Abrams production is costly arid time consuming.
27lvars Gutmanis, Research and Development, Engineering and Production ofAbrams
Tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Under Reduced Funding for the U.S.
Industrial Base, Report prepared for the U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment, International Security and Commerce, Washington, D.C.: Sterling Hobe
Foundation, October 1991, p. 19.
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3. Depleted Uranium Facility
The Department of Energy (DOE) Depleted Uranium (DU) facility in Idaho
Falls, Idaho, will cease operations if tank production for the Army is terminated. It is
the only facility in the U.S. capable of producing DU armor for the Abrams tank and
penetrators for the 120mm sabot round used with the tank's cannon. This will take place
because tanks scheduled for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) will not be equipped with DU
armor and the last new DU tank for the U.S. Army is scheduled for completion in March
1993. The M1A2 upgrade plan in the FY93 DOD budget will keep the plant open
through 1995.
J. OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO DOD, CONGRESS AND INDUSTRY
1. Policy Options
The following three options to sustain the tank industrial base are among
several that DOD, Congress, and industry have proposed and are evaluating as of this
writing:
a. OPTION ONE: The Army should mothball the Lima, Ohio tank plant
after the last Abrams is built.
This option is based on a strategy of sacrificing n ar-term procurement
in order to maintain viable research and development programs for the future. This
includes a complete layaway of LATP, extensive layoffs, and complete termination of
production. This option also creates a loss of conceptual, engineering and management
expertise associated with tank production but not necessarily tank design. As a result,
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future starts would result in significant shifts in the learning curve. Under mobilization
conditions, it is estimated that it would take at least three or more years to bring
production from 0 to 120 tanks per month. GDLS makes up about ten percent of
General Dynamics' business and the MI is the primary vehicle manufactured by GDLS.
Total plant closure would not make it economically viable for General Dynamics to own
GDLS even though LATP is Government-owned. This closure plan would also be
catastrophic to second- and third-tier subcontractors, with many of these going out of
business or shifting their business to the commercial sector.
b. OPTION TWO: The Army should reduce production to the minimum
production rate that will keep the factory operational until the factory
retools for the next generation tank.
This option again is based on a strategy of sacrificing near-term
procurement in order to maintain viable research and development programs for the
future. This would include dropping production from the current thirty tanks per month
to twenty per month. This would maintain a production process, critical equipment and
skills and would provide for an orderly expansion of production in a national emergency.
There would be some loss of skilled workers and engineers, but the learning curve would
remain stable until production expanded and a dip would be experienced as new workers
and engineers were hired.
Producing at such low numbers could become inefficient and significantly
raise unit costs. This situation is aggravated at subcontractor level and many would not
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be willing to produce at less than reasonable per unit costs. Current foreign military
sales contracts are insufficient to sustain production at rational per unit costs.
c. OPTION THREE: The Army should complete production of the MIA1
tank and then use the factory to retrofit/upgrade older model tanks to
the MIA2.
This course of action bridges the Ml to the Block III by incorporating
emerging technologies into the Block II. The retrofit program consists of taking an Ml
or MIAI tank and converting it to an M1A2. The process is less costly than building
a brand new MlA2 tank because rather than build a completely new tank, only the turret
of the tank is newly built while the hull and propulsion system of the MIA2 come from
a refurbished M1 hull and engine. Overall, the cost to convert an older Abrams to an
MIA2 is roughly two-thirds the cost of building a brand new M1A2 tank.28 Specific
costs, under different configurations, for the M1A2 reconversion program are contained
in Appendix C.
The retrofit process includes the following: (1) older tanks are shipped
to a depot where the hull is separated from the turret; (2) common or reusable
components such as the engine, transmission and hull are kept, while the turrets are
disassembled, demilitarized, and scrapped; (3) hulls and other common components are
overhauled and sent to LATP for reassembly including M1A2 particular component
2 8
-Gary R. Diaz and Donald L. Gilleland, "The M1A2 Conversion Programme,"
Military Technology, February 1992, p. 1.
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upgrades; and (4) the refurbished hulls are then married to newly built MIA2 turrets
which would inch'Je the latest upgrades.
This option would maintain the industrial base and workforce at all levels
while maintaining relatively state-of-the-art equipment in the field. The exception to this
is that the Stratford Army Engine Plant (SAEP) and the Allison Transmission Division
(ATD) would partially shut down except for limited spare parts production.
Full funding for this course of action has been approved for 210 tanks
in the FY93 budget. But the three billion dollars needed to reconvert the remaining 792
tanks between 1996-1999 may be difficult to obtain in the current budget climate. This
course of action would keep tank production at current levels and incorporate depot
services from Anniston Army Depot and Red River Army depot as well. In conclusion,
this option maintains the industrial base while providing the armor force with
technologically superior weapon systems.
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MI. THE TANK INDUSTRIAL BASE WORKFORCE
A. INTRODUCTION
Tank production requires specialized skills in many disciplines, found nowhere in
the commercial sector. This chapter will examine the effects of the three options
suggested for sustaining the unique workforce associated with and necessary for a tank
industrial base.
B. WORKFORCE ISSUES
The major issues affecting the tank industrial base workforce are worker training
and certification. However, other considerations such as effects on the depleted uranium
facility workforce will also be examined.
1. Training and Certification
The Lima Army Tank Plant (LATP) and General Dynamics-Land Systems
Division (GDLS) employ over 8000 workers and engineers conducting research, design,




SPECIALIZED TANK MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT
"* Computer and direct numerical controls (CNC)
"* Robotics welding machinery
"• Turret machinery equipment
"* Plasma armor plate cutting equipment
"* Complex machinery systems
"* Special DU armor fabrication equipment
"• Large aluminum casting and forging equipment
"* Advanced optical coating machinery
* Very large steel casting equipment
Source: GDLS.
This equipment, in turn, requires specialized skills associated with tank
production that can only be found at LATP and GDLS. In their 1991 and 1992 closure
studies, Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) and GDLS identified and classified these
critical personnel skills. They were: (1) that personnel are highly trained and
experienced, (2) they require a long training period, and (3) that there exists a shortage
of those skills in industry.
The specific critical skills that were identified included:
"* Certified ballistic welders
"* Computer numericzi control personnel: programmers, troubleshooters, repairmen,
and machine operators
"* Direct numerical control personnel: programmers, troubleshooters, repairmen, and
machine operators
"* Dye penetrant and magnetic particle inspectors
"* Precision tool engineers and other special purpose personnel
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Many of these personnel, including subcontractor peisonnel, are required to
have a minimum of five years experience in other related areas of expertise, plus an
additional two years of training in specific Abrams manufacturing skills. For example,
of the workforce at LATP, there are 600 certified ballistic welders on the production
line. The training cycle for a ballistic welder is a lengthy and difficult process.
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Figure 5 Ballistic Welder Certification Cycle
Source: TACOM.
As Figure 5 shows, GDLS starts with journeyman welders with a minimum
of two years experience and tests them for one week. The journeyman welder then
attends a nine week certification course plus thirteen or more weeks of ballistic
qualification. Even after this process, not all ballistic welders attain the required
certification to work on the tank assembly line.
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From the research and development aspect of tank manufacture, the engineers
who make up the design staff at GDLS must have expertise in several areas to include
metalworking, electrical engineering, optics, advanced materials and ballistics. Much
of the design staff has had previous experience in tank design with "many senior
engineers and managers associated with M1 development and production having cut their
teeth on earlier tank programs."29 The Abrams workforce has considerable experience
behind it and the efforts required to train it to proficiency have been lengthy. In sum,
the cost of human capital at LATP and GDLS has been high.
2. The Depleted Uranium Facility
Should the Depleted Uranium (DU) facility close given production
termination, future production restarts for DU armor will be made more difficult over
time as labor skills degrade and disappear. Certification for DU workers requires
permits from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Worker certification is a lengthy process and for these reasons, it is estimated that if the
DU facility is closed, it would take 24-42 months to start up DU production for tank
armor.
3. Additional Workforce Considerations
Additional considerations that also impact the effects of the three options on
the workforce is the impact of the aging workforce in industry overall. Compounding
'
9BG(Ret) Philip L. Bolte, "Budget Cuts: Effects On the Industrial Base," Part I of
II Articles, National Defense, April 1991, p. 33.
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the problems associated with maintaining the experience involved in tank production, "a
skilled but aging workforce will leave the defense sector over the next ten years, with
or without plant closings."" This aging of the workforce must be considered when
evaluating the options to layoff workers. Traditionally, it has been the senior worker
who supervises the junior worker and assimilates or mentors him into the system. Loss
of this talent without an influx of new replacements could be potentially disastrous for
future tank production.
C. WORKFORCE ANALYSIS
The following is an analysis of the potential effects of each of the three options
available to DOD, Congress and industry upon the tank industrial base workforce.
1. OPTION ONE: The Army should mothball the Lima, Ohio tank plant
after the last Abrams tank is built.
As stated earlier, this option is based on a strategy of sacrificing near-term
procurement in order to maintain a viable research and development program for future
tank programs. This includes a complete layaway of LATP, extensive employee layoffs
and termination of tank production. TACOM defines layaway as the process of retaining
"
3
°Association of the United States Army, "Industrial Base," Statement by General
Jack N. Merritt, U.S. Army (Ret), before the Panel on Structure of the U.S. Defense
Industrial Base, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. house of Representatives,
102nd Congress, 19 February 1992, p. 7.
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and storing industrial facilities that are no longer required to support current production
but may be required to support production at a later date.3"
As shown in Table VI, the TACOM closure studies estimate that production
termination would eliminate over 4000 personnel specifically at the following locations:
TABLE VI
EMPLOYEE REDUCTIONS GIVEN PRODUCTION TERMINATION
Location Personnel Losses
Lima Army Tank Plant 2191
Detroit Army Tank Plant 481
Scranton Complex Machining Plant 381
Sterling Heights Electro/Optical Plant 313
Central Office Complex/GDLS Headquarters 702
Total 4068
Source: TACOM.
An additional 5048 employees would lose jobs in the primary vendor
locations at Watervliet and Rock Island Arsenals, Stratford Army Engine Plant (SAEP),
and Allison Transmission Division (ATD). The Government is contractually liable for
human resource separation costs at all the above locations. Human resource costs are
defined as all costs aisociated with separation of contractor personnel including
separation pay, health care, supplemental benefits, group insurance, pensions and dental
care. From a workforce perspective, the Government can expect to pay out at least
"
31U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command, Abrams Program Closure Study, Warren,
MI: Unpublished Slides, September 1990, Slide ICC 3.
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$96.3 million in human resource separation costs for total production teimination.32
For example, according to the August 1991 Abrarns Program Closure Study, human
resource costs at LATP would be $37.4 million in 1991 budget dollars.
a. Advantages
Because of the high costs of eliminating the tank production workforce.
there are few advantages to terminating production of this unique product. But given the
current defense budget climate, a plethora of fielded systems, and the current
technological superiority of the M1A1 over other tanks, there is little justification in
supporting a workforce that will continue to manufacture excess systems.
b. Disadvantages
Because the long training period required to prepare a GDLS employee
for tank production, closure of LATP will force the employee to seek employment
outside his field of expertise. Not only will this degrade his skills in the long-term, but
in the event of a production restart in the future, he will require a lengthy retraining and
certification period. There is also no guarantee that a worker will return to work for tank
production once established in another job.
This option also affects senior engineers and managers at LATP and
GDLS. This is critical to GDLS since the only product it manufactures is the MI-series
tank. "The expertise of tank designing is perhaps the most critical, yet most difficult to
3
•
2U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command, Abrams Program Closure Study (Austere),
Warren, MI: Unpublished Slides, 13 August 1991, Slide VC 10.
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define, potential loss faced by stopping tank production."'33 The tank, being a unique
product, is a result of many years of design experience which includes a talent to mesh
many conflicting requirements into one properly system-engineered weapon system. The
skills lost would be hard to replace.
As GDLS management and the workforce become familiar with overall
production techniques, the increase in production efficiency and quality is reflected in the
learning curve. General Dynamics-Land Systems Division has collected monthly data
on hours per unit fronm the Abrams' inception. For the first 2000 MIs, the learning rate
based on a regression analysis reflected a 90.2 percent learning curve for both LATP and
DATP.34 General Dynamics also stated that they have not developed a learning curve
for the MIA1 as it would be misleading since there was a multiyear contract and an
Industrial Productivity Improvement Program with funding provided for improvements.
Since the funds were one time investments, the curves generated would not be
representative of normal learning; "however, some slight improvement can be attributed
to the continuation of normal learning."'I
The learning curve reflects an increase in production efficiency and
quality over time and a concurrent cost decrease given an uninterrupted production run.
The Abrams program has thus far shown that, "as Ml production proceeded, deficiencies
33BG(Ret) Philip L. Bolte, "Tank Industrial Base Issues," Personal letter to the
researcher, 10 July 1992, p. 4.
4M.A. Puzzuoli, Memorandum/facsimile to the researcher from Manager, Quality




decreased, but as major changes were introduced there was a sudden increase in
deficiencies. This was followed by a decrease as management and workers became more
familiar with the changes. ,,36
Termination of production could cause a major shift in the learning curve
with significant production efficiency and cost reduction lost. "Among defense
programs, this factor is unique in the area of development and production, because there
is no equivalent commercial activity that might serve as a peacetime storehouse for the
talent. "37
In sum, TACOM and GDLS represent a vast sum of knowledge based
on experience that would be lost by going to layaway.
c. Conclusions for Option One
From a workforc. perspective, the effects of total production termination
are potentially the most devast. ting to preserving the tank industrial base. The loss of
over 9000 jobs, from the welder to the senior engineer, will not only be the immediate
effect felt in industry. The projected loss of personnel skills, qualifications, and
experience along with the decrease in production efficiency and quality would occur
fairly rapidly. This would have a significant effect if a requirement to design and
produce a new tank occurred in a few years. Future costs to retrain a workforce would
36BG(Ret) Philip L. Bolte, "Budget Cuts: Effects On the Industrial Base," Part II of
m Articles, National Defense, May/June 91, p. 8.
37BG(Ret) Philip L. Bolte, "Budget Cuts: Effect s On the Industrial Base," Part I of
mI Articles, National Defense, April 1992, p. 33.
51
be high as well. For example, if the total layaway occurred for a period of ten years,
a large portion of the $1.4 billion to start production of the Block 1M1 tank would be
attributed to retraining the workforce. 8 The long term effects for future tank design
and production are potentially damaging without a core of skilled workers, engineers and
managers.
2. OPTION TWO: The Army should reduce production to the minimum
production rate that will keep the plant operational until the plant retools
for the next generation tank.
This option is based on a trickle production rate which is defined as a
"minimum sustaining rate that maintains a production process, critical equipment, skills,
and provides for an orderly expansion to full-rate production in an emergency."39 This
option drops production of the MIA1 tank or reconversions to the M1A2 from a current
thirty tanks per month to a low of ten per month. In all trickle rates except at thirty per
month, workers will be laid off as reflected in Table VII. This table shows the employee




39TACOM, Abrams Program Closure Study, Slide ICC 3.
52
TABLE VII
TRICKLE RATE PRODUCTION EMPLOYEE LOSSES AND COSTS
30/month 20/month 15/raontL 10/month
LATP 0 235 587 1053
Scranton 0 47 111 197
Sterling 0 26 68 146
Central Office Complex 0 31 64 338
Total Personnel 0 339 830 1734




The advantages of maintaining a trickle rate of ten tanks per month is
that a warm base would be maintained which would retain an active core workforce in
tank production. This core force can be used in an emergency to smooth the assimilation
of rehired and new personnel. This core also serves as the basis for a rejuvenated
workforce should a peacetime need for expansion arise. The framework for experience
and certification is retained by maintaining a trickle production rate.
b. Disadvantages
The loss of skilled workers at all rates excluding the thirty per month
production rate could be critical in a full mobilization scenario or under surge conditions
given a lower production rate. To bring in new workers under emergency conditions,
train, recertify, and give them the necessary experience on the production line, would
take a minimum of thirty-six months before a surge rate of 120 tanks per month could
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be achieved." It is likely that this surge would initially cause a drop in production
efficiency and per unit cost increase as new processes were learned or releamed.
c. Conclusions for Option Two
This option is dependent on the trickle production rate selected. The
lower the production rate, the more skilled workers that will be lost and the higher the
costs associated with rehiring and training them in the event of a production surge. A
rate closer to thirty per month would retain more skills and exrerience for the future
while allowing for a more rapid production increase in the case of surge or industrial
mobilization.
3. OPTION THREE: The Army should complete production of the MIAI
tank and then use the factory to retrofit/upgrade older model tanks to
the MIA2 tank.
As stated earlier, this course of action bridges the Ml to the Block m tank
by incorporating emerging technologies into the Block II. This retrofit will require the
Stratford Army Engine Plant (SAEP) and Allison Transmission Division (ATD) to reduce
operations. Therefore there would be layoffs at these two facilities but production would
remain between twenty to thirty tanks per month.
a. Advantages
An uninterrupted production run not only enables a skilled workforce to
remain in place, but best preserves the human skills necessary to build a tank. The
4
°TACOM, Abrams Program Closure Study, Slide ICC 19.2.
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experience gained by management, engineers, and workers on the MIAl design and
production cycle should carry over to the MIA2 program without a degradation of skills
due to a break in production. Because the interior design and technology incorporated
into the MlA2 is unlike that of the MIAl, one can expect a change in the learning curve
as the workforce learns to produce the M1A2. Compared to Option One and Option
Two, this change would not be as pronounced. One can expect product quality to
increase and production costs to decrease rapidly with the first few tanks off the
production line.
b. Dhsadvantages
The disadvantages of this option are marginal because the workforce
involved in producing the MIA1 tank would remain in place except at SAEP and ATD
as mentioned earlier. Some workers would be lost at both facilities but a smaller
workforce would still remain at these two facilities to continue limited spares and repair
parts production.
c. Conclusions for Option Three
In terms of human capital, this option seeks to establish the foundation
necessary to preserve the tank industrial base for the long-term. It allows for better
management of the tank industrial base workforce given a future crisis requiring a surge




The option that best preserves the tank industrial base from the workforce
perspective is Option Three. Option Three, with the exceptions made for SAEP and
ATD, enables the workforce to produce an upgraded tank and allows for the transition
in production from the M1A1 to the M1A2 to be made under peacetime conditions. It
also sets the stage for future main battle tank production by maintaining a skilled and
experienced workforce.
Option Two is the next best plan because much of the workforce is retained
depending on the selected production rate. Thirty tanks per month would be the optimal
rate in order to maintain the entire workforce. Any rate less than thirty per month would
result in a loss of skills in the industry.
The least desirable option would be to terminate production as described in Option
One. The loss of the skills and experience from management to the production worker
would be potentially damaging in the event of a national emergency requiring surge or
industrial mobilization or even in the event of a peacetime production restart.
In conclusion, terminating production would be the most damaging to the workforce
involved in tank design and production, while retrofitting the older tanks to the MlA2
would best insure retention of the experience and skills garnered from the last sixteen




The costs involved ", execute any of the options presented are a major factor to
consider, especially in th, current budget climate and overall drawdown occurring in the
Department of Defense kDOD). This chapter will analyze the costs involved in eAecuting
the three options and their effects on preserving the tank industrial base.
B. COST ANALYSIS FACTORS
In 1989, the Army directed Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) to conduct a
closure study for the Detroit Army Tant Plant (DATP). DATP was subsequently
directed to cease production in September 1991 as overall tank production was dropped.
In 1990, the Army directed TACOM to Lnduct a closure study for Lima Army Tank
Plant (LATP), which was released in August 1991. A revised study with modified cost
estimates was released in April 1992.
The scope of these studies included options to (1) lay away the industrial facilities
at LATP and satellite facilities for future use, (2) sustain a trickle production rate that
would maintain the production process, critical equipment and skills, and would establish
a framework for orderly expansion of production in an emergency, and (3) conduct
retrofit of older Ml tanks to the MIA2. These cost estimates were formulated by
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TACOM, General Dynamics-Land Systems Division (GDLS), and the Department of
Energy (DOE).
1. Assumptions
During the course of these studies, several assumptions were made that would
be the basis for the costs presented. They were,
* Restoration of all facilities would be to Occupational Health and Safety
Administration (OSHA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards.
"* The trickle production rate would be twenty tanks per month.
"* M1/MlA1 to M1A2 conversions would be twenty tanks per month.
"* Contractors would maintain spares production when tank production ceased.
"* Vendors/subcontractors that would not or could not produce at twenty tanks per
month would be replaced.
"* Equipment would be laid away using best commercial practices.
"* A cold base or laid away facility would impact future startup costs for the Block
III tank or Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT).
"* Block m production would start in the fourth quarter of FY01.
2. Other Cost Considerations
When presenting tank per unit costs, a number of variables impact vehicle
costs. Variables that must be considered include multiyear contract scenario versus
annual production contracts, rates in effect at the time of production, total contract
production, learning rates applied to smaller quantities over shorter or longer durations,
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inflation, and the cost. of training, support, spares, and warranty considerations. 4"
Foreign sales of the M1A2 are impacted by configuration changes unique to each couatry
in terms of radios, communication equipment, changes to equipment to accommodate
language differences, and hardware provided by the purchasing country for installation
in the tank.
Questions comparing the per unit cost of a newly-built M1A2 with that of an
Ml reconverted into an M1A2 tank focus on the work breakdown structure. Will GDLS
perform all work for teardown or will the Government perform the work at the depots
prior to GDLS assembly and test; will original components be refurbished, used in the
original as is condition, or replaced with new components; and what level of testing
should also be required?42 Current estimates of specific per unit costs for the converted
tanks and production tanks are contained in Appendix C.
3. Facilities
Abrams production is keyed on a number of facilities excluding
subcontractors. The following facilities represented the main production base for the
Abrams tank and consequently were the focus of the cost analysis.
a. General Dynamics-Land Systems Division
As described earlier, GDLS includes a number of facilities. They are
the Central Office Complex (COC) located in Sterling Heights, Michigan, the Scranton
4 1M.A. Puzzuoli, Memorandum/facsimile to the researcher from Manager, Quality
Programs, General Dynamics-Land Systems Division .8 January 1993, p- 1.
42puzzuoli, p. 2.
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complex machining and metalworking plant in Scranton, Pennsylvania, and the Sterling
Heights electro/optical facility in Sterling Heights, Michigan. The COC is GDLS
headquarters, located near TACOM headquarters. Sterling Heights manufactures
electronic components, sighting equipment, and wiring harnesses for the tank.
b. Detroit Army Tank Plant
The Detroit Army Tank Plant (DATP) ceased tank production in late
1991. A workforce of 480 employees is being retained at DATP and will continue to
conduct complex machining operations and some component manufacturing until the
Abrams production run is completed. According to GDLS, the plant machines various
components for vehicle assembly and produces 50 percent of Abrams production gun
mounts, with Rock Island Arsenal producing the remaining gun mounts. Currently, the
Government requires GDLS to maintain an in-house surge capacity of 90 per month for
components and 45 per month for gun mounts at DATP.43
c. Lima Army Tank Plant
Lima Army Tank Plant (LATP) is the current and future core facility for
Abrams tank production. Completely rebuilt in the late 1970s for initial M1 tank
production, GDLS has invested over $400 million in making it a state-of-art assembly
line employing over 2200 people.
43pUZZUoli, p. 3.
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d. Allison Transmission Division
Allison Transmission Division (ATD), a division of General Motors
Corporation, produces the Abrams Xl100 transmission. Located in Indianapolis,
Indiana, the facility employs a total of 5700 employees with 800 workers dedicated to
X1 100 production. ATD has about 85 percent of the world's capacity in transmission
manufacture.
Current transmission design has built-in flexibility for use with diesel or
gas turbine engines. ATD continually undertakes research, development, and engineering
for X1100 transmissions, resulting in rapid technological advances in electronics and
metal used in the transmission.
e. Stratford Army Engine Plant
Textron Lycoming is the producer of the AGT1500 gas turbine engine
used on the Abrams tank. This gas turbine is unique since almost all the heavy armor
systems in the world use diesel propulsion systems. Lycoming operates the Stratford
Army Engine Plant (SAEP) which produces an annual average of 540 engines for the
Abrams tank. Lycoming has committed considerable resources to research, development,
engineering, and prototyping of the gas turbine. "Much of this research and development
activity may be explained by the fact that there exists a fierce competition between gas
turbine and diesel engine proponents in the future propulsion units for heavy armor."'
4Ivars Gutmanis, Research and Development, Engineering and Production ofAbrams
Tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Under Reduced Funding for the U. S.
Industrial Base, Report prepared for the U.S. Congress. Office of Technology
Assessment, International Security and Commerce, Washington, D.C.: Sterling Hobe
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This competition requires SAEP to maintain technologically advanced manufacturing
equipment and processes in order to produce engines.
f. Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command
The Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (AMCCOM)
oversees Government furnished material suppliers such as Hughes Aircraft, Computing
Devices of Canada, Rock Island and Watervliet Arsenal, Kollmorgan, Plessey, and
Kearfott Guidance Navigation, who provide components to GDLS.
g. Department of Energy Depleted Uranium Facility
The Department of Energy (DOE) Depleted Uranium (DU) facility in
Idaho Falls, Idaho, is the only facility in the U.S. currently capable of producing DU
armor for the Abrams tank and penetrators for the 120mm sabot round used with the
tank's cannon. Should U.S. tank production terminate, the plant will close because tanks
produced for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) will not be equipped with DU armor but with
conventional armor. The last new U.S. tank requiring DU armor is currently schedu .4*
for completion in March 1993. The FY93 DOD appropriation will extend DU
production until 1995.
4. Evaluation Factors
The following cost factors were used to evaluate the three options presented
in order to standardize the analysis. The cost factors were human resources, facility
Foundation, October 1991, p. 111.
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layaway, equipment layaway, equipment removal, environmental, close out penalty,
maintenance/caretaker, program management, and miscellaneous costs.
a. Human Resources Costs
Human resources costs were discussed previously and include those costs
associated with contractor personnel such as separation pay, health care, supplemental
benefits, group insurance, pension plans and dental care. The Government is
contractually liable for such human resource separation costs.
b. Facility Layaway Costs
Facility layaway costs are costs associated with real property or physical
plant layaway. Facilities can be classified as property (other than material, special
tooling, military property, and special test equipment) for production, maintenance,
research, development or test. Facilities also include real property, buildings, structural
improvements, and plant equipment.
c. Equipment Layaway Costs
Equipment layaway costs are costs associated with laying away industrial
plant equipment, other plant requipment, special test equipment, and special tooling."5
Definitions for the different categories of equipment are contained in Appendix B.
Equipment details are also specified in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part
'Defense Systems Management College, Integrating Industrial Preparedness Into The
Acquisition Process, A Guide for Program Managers, First Edition, Fort Belvoir, VA:
DSMC, April 1989, p. 5.1-1.
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45, Government Property and DOD Directive 4275.5, Acquisition and Management of
Industrial Resources.
d. Equipment Removal Costs
Equipment removal costs are costs for planning, disconnecting,
packaging, crating, handling and shipping of Government-owned equipment.
e. Environmental Costs
Environmental costs include site surveys, publication and update of an
environmental cleanup plan, and other remedial actions in accordance with Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regulations.
f. Close Out Penalty Costs
The close out penalty is a contractual obligation incurred by the
Government for reduction of the production rate. General Dynamics executes
termination costs in accordance with the requirements identified in its contracts. These
requirements identified by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.249-2 Termination
for Convenience of the Government and FAR 52.249.9 Default are the guiding documents
as to how GDLS determines and calculates termination costs.
g. Maintenance/Caretaker Costs
Maintenance/caretaker costs are the costs associated with utilities,
maintenance, security, fire protection, and staff of the laidaway facility and its
equipment.
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h. Program Management Costs
Program management costs or PM Office costs are those efforts required
to coordinate internal and external office functions, and track costs, including costs for
inventory, progress and preparation of reports to maintain schedules and budgets.
i. Miscellaneous Costs
Miscellaneous costs are those costs that deal with layaway which are not
covered in the work breakdown structure.
Given these cost factors, analysis of the effects of each option on the tank
industrial base and more importantly, budget considerations, is standardized.
C. COST ANALYSIS
An analysis of the potential cost effects of each of the three options available to
DOD, Congress and industry is presented below.
1. OPTION ONE: The Army should mothball the Lima, Ohio tank plant
after the last Abrams tank is built.
This option is analyzed through the costs projected to terminate production
from a current production rate of thirty tanks per month. Layaway is defined as the
process of retaining and storing industrial facilities that are no longer required to support
current production but may be required to support production at a later date. Because
new production of the Block III tank was originally projected to begin in fourth quarter,
FY01, cost planning figi s were based on the assumption that there would be an eight-
to ten-year closure from March 1993 to late 2001. At 2001, production would begin on
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no-t
the Block MIT tank. Costs for the total layaway at each facility are contained in Table
VyI.
TABLE VIII
TOTAL LAYAWAY IN PLACE (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
DATP LATP GDLS ATD SAEP AMCCOM DOE TOTAL
Human 26.9 37.4 23.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 5.8 96.3
Resources
Facility 6.1 11.2 8.8 1.0 0.0 3.7 0.0 30.8
Layaway
Equipment 5.4 22.1 7.9 1.4 1.8 1.2 0.0 39.8
Layaway
Equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Removal
EPA Bill 8.4 11.6 1.2 0.3 Unk 0.0 28.7 50.2
Close Out 14.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.6
Penalty
Maint. & 37.8 61.6 34.5 58.3 4.2 1.2 118.5 316.1
Caretaker
PM Office 5.5 8.4 6.5 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 21.4
Miscell. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Total 104.7 152.3 81.9 65.0 6.0 6.3 153.2 569.4
Source: Abrams Program Closure Study (Austere), 13 August 1991.
As reflected in Table VIII, total closure cost was estimated to be $569.4 million.
The bulk of the cost comes from the primary tank production facilities at LATP and
DATP, and the DOE DU facility closure.
a. Advantages
The advantages from a cost perspective are that DOD will at least
maintain the capability to restart production in the event of new production or a major
mobilization. However, production restart from total layaway is estimated to be seventy-
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two months. There are benefits to putting tank production in a mothballed status given
the excess number of tanks in the U.S. Army's inventory. The startup costs for the
Block III tank or FMBT are reduced compared to starting up from a completely
dismantled tank production capability. Laying away the tank production facilities also
allows caretaker personnel to initiate remedial EPA actions and/or remain current with
changing EPA regulations. Additionally, termination of production allows DOD to
redirect funds to other programs in the acquisition cycle in this era of reduced spending.
b. Disadvantages
The cost of shutting down the tank industrial base is high and revised
cost estimates could be higher. For example, the September 1991 cost for total layaway
was $569.4 million. In a later study conducted by an independent industrial analysis
team released on April 1992, costs for total layaway were increased by $100 million over
the previous estimate to $670 million.
There is currently $968 million projected as non-productive costs to lay away
the tank industrial base for ten to fifteen years. This includes $20 million a year
in non-productive costs to decommission the DU armor facility. Restart costs for
layaway for FMBT is $1.4 billion, $620 million of that is for work on Abrams
tooling, much of this cost could be avoided by maintaining a warm base.46
Total DU facility closure cost is estimated at $153.2 million with restart
costs after a two-year or more closure projected to be $175 million due to the added
costs of retraining and recertifying personnel. Additionally, many of the EPA, OSHA
46MG(Ret) Oscar Decker, Joseph Aquino and Stephen D. Napier, Military Industrial
Base Sector Study, Tracked and Wheeled Vehicles, Final Report from the Independent
Industrial Analysis Team to Headquarters, U.S. Army Material Command, 28 April
1992, p. 10.
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and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licenses will have expired at the two-year
mark adding to the restart costs after the two-year mark.
Table IX depicts the costs estimated for restarting production from total
plant closure given that the DU facility has been closed for two or more years. The
Abrams column shows the varying rates and costs associated with restarting Abrams
production while the Armored Systems Modernization (ASM) column depicts the varying
rates and costs of restarting production with a future main battle tank or the Block III.
The higher costs in the ASM column are attributed to retooling and facilities upgrade
required to begin production on a new weapon system.
TABLE IX
RESTART/RAMP-UP COSTS
FY92 Costs in Millions
Abrams ASM
0 Vehicles/month 740 1,400
10 Vehicles/month 300 1.000
15 Vehicles/month 240 950
20 Vehicles/month 215 935
30 Vehicles/month 170 820
Source: TI COM.
Since this chart assumes an eight- to ten-year closure period, costs will
increase considerably if the facilities remain closed beyond this length of time or the
overall economic situation deteriorates.
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c. Conclusions for Option One
This course of action becomes costlier over time. Although the data
presented are estimates, rapidly changing decisions and policies being made by DOD,
Congress, and industry could easily affect the estimates. The data serve to show that the
costs involved in shutting down a single source for tank production will outweigh the
long-term benefits of such an action. For example, shutting down tank production at a
cost of S569.4 million would require $764 million to restart production at a later date for
a total cost of $1.3 billion with no tanks to show for these costs. In comparison, GDLS
has proposed to upgrade 240 older M-1 tanks per year to the MIA2 at a cost of $619
million.47 The costs to shut down then would not seem worthwhile in comparison to
keeping some production active. It would take fifty-one months to produce th,.: first
Abrams from total layaway at a cost of $1.1 billion and $1.4 billion for the Block III
tank. With the funding for closure spread out over several years, the annual budget
process would not guarantee the requested funds from year to year. The risk is that less
than requested funding will force DOD and industry to execute a less than adequate
closure process, potentially leading to further degradation of U.S. tank production
capability and increased future restart costs.
"
4TGary R. Diaz and Donald L. Gilleland, "The MIA2 Conversion Programme,"
Military Technology, February 1992, p. 6.
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2. OPTION TWO: The Army should reduce production to the minimum
production rate that will keep the factory operational until the factory
retools for the next generation tank.
This option assumes a production rate of twenty tanks per month which will
maintain the tank industrial base in its entirety. This warm base would leave DATP
closed for production but remain open for complex machining operations and some
component production until Abrams procurement is complete. Table X depicts the costs
required to reduce production to twenty tanks per month.
TABLE X
LAYAWAY TO 20 TANKS PER MONTH
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
DATP LATP GDLS ATD SAEP AMCCOM DOE TOTAL
Human 15.3 4.0 1.9 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.4
Resources
Facility 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.u
Layaway
Equipment 1.5 3.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.9
Layaway
Equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Removal
EPA Bill 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 Unk 0.0 0.0 1.5
Close Out 14.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.6
Penalty
Maint. & 36.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.9
Caretaker
PM Office 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2
Miscell. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 70.6 7.2 2.4 3.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 83.5
Source: Abrams Program Closure Study (Austere), 13 August 1991.
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Total cost for this option is $83.5 million. The majority of costs would come from
production termination at DATP. As shown in Table X, the bulk of DATP's costs
comes from workforce layoffs, maintenance/caretaker costs, and close out penalty costs.
a. Advantages
The biggest advantage of this option is that production of Abrams will
continue. The biggest cost savings comes from not closing the DU facility because
closure costs at t'.e DU facility alone are $153.2 million. Detroit Army Tank Plant will
retain complex machining and component production for the near-term. For this reason,
the majority of costs for this option come out of DATP to maintain the laidaway tank
production capability. Overall the tank industrial base essentially remains intact and
causes future ASM and future main battle tank startup costs to be significantly reduced
as compared to total layaway.
b. Disadvantages
Production at a low production rate would result in allocation of indirect
costs to fewer tanks. Examples of these overhead costs would be things such as
depreciation of plant equipments and tooling, insurance, rent, security and utilities.
There would also be a loss of quantity discounts on parts purchases and components that
are attributable to higher production rates. An example of per unit cost differences can
be shown in the various production mixes for FY94. In FY94, should GDLS produce
a total of 10 MIAI tanks and no MIA2 tanks, the unit cost of the MIAI will be $6.6
million. Should GDLS produce 10 MIAI tanks and 20 M1A2 tanks, unit costs for the
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MIAI would drop to $3.9 million each.48 The allocation of overhead to fewer tanks
would result in higher per unit costs extending down to the subcontractor and resulting
in fewer purchases of tanks for the dollar.
c. Conclusions for Option Two
This option combines cost avoidance with preservation of the tank
industrial base and the DOE DU facility. This combination occurs because the cost to
reduce production from thirty to twenty tanks is minimal given the benefits of preserving
the tank production base. For example, reducing production at a cost of $83.5 million
is far less than terminating tank production and restarting at a future date at a cost of
over $1 billion (Option One). It is assumed that future ASM or FMBT startup costs will
also be reduced since production would continue.
3. OPTION THREE: The Army should complete production of the MiA1
tank and then use the factory to retrofit/upgrade older model tanks to
the MIA2.
This coaversion program bridges the M1 to the Block III tank or FMBT by
incorporating emerging technologies into the Block H tank. The retrofit program consists
of taking an Ml or MIA1 tank and converting it to an MIA2 in a process described in
Chapter Two. The conversion costs are less for an MIAI to MlA2 than for an early
model MIA1 -id MIIP to MlA2 because the early model tanks were equipped with the
105mm gun and fire control system instead of the 120mm gun found on the MlAl and
"
48U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command, Abrams Program Closure Study, Warren,
MI: Unpublished Slides, September 1990, Slide VC 17.
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MIA2. Overall, the cost to convert an older Abrams to an MlA2 is roughly two-thirds
the cost of building a brand new M1A2 tank."9 The costs to convert current MIA1 tank
production to M1A2 conversion capability are contained in Table XI.
TABLE XI
LAYAWAY TO 20 M1A2 TANK CONVERSIONS PER MONTH
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
DATP I LATP GDLSI ATD SAEP I AMCCOM I DOE I TOTAL
Human 16.2 4.0 1.9 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.3
Resources
Facility 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Layaway
Equipment 2.2 4.2 0.3 1.4 1.8 0.0 0.0 9.9
Layaway
Equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Removal
EPA Bill 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 Unk 0.0 0.0 1.8
Close Out 14.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.6
Penalty
Maint. & 36.9 0.0 0.0 58.3 4.2 0.0 0.0 99.4
Caretaker
PM Office 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1
Miscell. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 72.3 8.4 2.4 65.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 154.1
Source: Abrams Program Closure Study (Austere), 13 August 1991.
The cost of this option is $154.1 million, with the majority of costs coming
from production termination at DATP and partial closures at Allison Transmission
Division (ATD) since refurbished transmissions would come from existing tanks. Costs
to partially layaway SAEP and ATD total $71.0 million. Some of the other costs are
49Gary R. Diaz and Donald L. Gilleland, "The MIA2 Conversion Programme,"
Military Technology, February 1992, p. 1.
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attributed to retooling for the MIA1 to M1A2 upgrade at LATP. Hull refurbishment,
as stated earlier, would most likely take place at depot organizations.
a. Advantages
The advantages of this option are that a conversion rate of twenty tanks
per month will maintain the DOE capability to produce DU and the production rate will
also reduce future ASM or FMBT startup costs.
b. Disadvantages
The disadvantages of Option Three are that the entire tank industrial base
is not utilized because ATD and SAEP are now utilized for spares and repai- parts
support leading to partial layaway of these two facilities. This adds to
maintenance/caretaker costs at both facilities which comprise 64.5 percent of the $154.1
million overll costs to initiate the reconversion program. Since this $154.1 millhon cost
is projected across FY92 to FY01, limited funding or funding shortfalls during this nine-
year bridge to FY01 could hiinder the ixonversion process, force production to drop
below twenty tanks per month, and add to per unit costs of the system.
c. Conclusions for Option Three
Although Option Three costs $154.1 million to execute, it will provide
the Army with the most modern tank in the world. This plan is a compromise between
total plant closurc and continued production of the M1Al. Although it does not preserve
the entire tank industrial base, it will do the following: (1) maintain most of tile key
manufacturing capabiliti -, (2) field a superior system based on existing systems and
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reusable components combined with emerging technologies, and (3) bridge the gap
between the Abrams tank and the tank of the future.
D. SUMIVMARY
From a cost perspective the option that best minimizes cost to the Government is
Option Two because it will only cost $83.5 million and continue tank production. The
next best option is Option Three because the reconversion option will cost $154. 1 million
and will also continue tank production. Finally, the most expensive and detrimental to
the industrial base is Option One, which is total layaway of the industrial base at a cost
of $569.4 million. Not only is it the most costly, but the restart costs from total layaway
would be in excess of $1.0 oillion for the ASM or Abrams program.
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V. THIE SUBCONTRACTOR BASE
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the options available to second-tier
subcontractors for maintaining the tank industrial base. The tank industrial base can be
divided into five sectors or industrial segments and will be analyzed as such. The five
segments previously discussed in Chapter II are: (1) electronics/optics, (2) complex
machining, (3) basic materials, (4) weapons, and (5) propulsion." Each of the five
industrial segments is further broken up into entities that supply General Dynamics-Land
Systems Division (GDLS) or include firms that sell tank components to the Department
of Defense (DOD), which in turn supplies the components to GDLS as Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE).
B. OVERVIEW
As described in Chapter HI, tank production is a task that requires complex
component assembly techniques incorporating advanced technologies in the production
process. "Historically in the U.S., the prime contractors of heavy armor have relied for
a significant portion of these components to be supplied by a number of first-tier or
"
5
°The information presented in this chapter was drawn from two sources. The first
source was an independent study completed by the Sterling Hobe Foundation in 1991 for
the U.S. Congress, Office of Technology, International Security and Commerce. The
second source was from a 28 April 1992 Tank-Automotive Command Study covering the
propulsion and basic materials industrial segments of the tank industrial base.
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orincipal subcontractors.'"5' In the Abrams tank case, these firms supply to Abrams'
prime contractor, GDLS. Required components are then assembled by GDLS into the
MIA1 or M1A2 tanks.
The subcontractors analyzed in this chapter represent a portion of the 18,000 firms
that provide components that go into producing a tank.52 These firms range from those
totally dependent on tank proa4-tion to multiproduct firms that manufacture components
and end items for DOD and commercial markets. In some cases, tank components and
technologies have dual uses in both the military and commercial sectors. Often, the
proportion of these subcontractor assets devoted to tank production represents a small
portion of the firm's total assets. This in turn, may suggest that the financial condition,
technology status, and personnel training of these subcontractors are determined by sales
in the commercial sector rather than by tank component contiacts.53 In other cases,
subcontractors such as Textron Lycoming, the engine manufacturer for the tank, are
almosi totally dependent on tank production. To standardize policies governing every
tank industrial base subcontractor would then be unrealistic.
"
51ivars Gutmanis, Research and Development, Engineering and Production ofAbrams
Tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Under Reduced Funding for the U.S.
Industrial Base, Report prepared for the U.S. Copgress, Office of Technology
Assessment, International Security and Commerce, Washington, D.C.: Sterling Hobe
Foundation, October 1991, p. 45.
52U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, "Alternatives For The U.S. Tank




The following analysis suggests that tank subcontractors will fall into two
categories: those which maintain industrial capability and those which reduce it.
TABLE XII
CHARACTERISTICS GOVERNING SUBCONTRACTORS' FUTURE
INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES FOR ABRAMS COMPONENT PRODUCTION
Characteristics that Mfaintain Industrial Characteristics that Reduce Industrial
Capability Capability
Market Characteristics
Markets for Abrams components exist in other Markets for Abrams components consist
DOD programs and commercial sector exclusively of the Abrams Program
Technolozv Characteristics
Abrams components are manufactured on Abrams components are manufactured on
production lines and/or by use of technologies that production lines and/or by use of technologies
can be used in other product manufacture that cannot be used in other product manufacture
Tank component production lines and/or Tank component production lines and/or
technologies can be modified for manufacturing technologies cannot be modified for
other products manufacturing other products
Types of Firm Characteristics
Subcontractor represents a division of a Subcontractor is the sole industrial entity
multiproduct industrial entity
Source: Gutmanis.
The subcontractor base forms a continuum with regard to their ability to remain
viable suppliers to the Abrams tank program after funding is reduced or cut. At one end
of this continuum,
...are subcontractors that will be able to supply the required components for the
Abrams tank in the future, even in the event the funds for the Abrams tank are
completely cut. At the other end there are firms that will close down their Abrams
tank operations if the Abrams tank funds are significantly reduced.54
54Gutmanis, p. 82.
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The diversity of subcontractors should suggest that the policy options to maintaining
the tank industrial base have to be tailored to the various subcontractors' needs and that
the future composition of a tank industrial base among subcontractors will depend on the
future funding levels for the Abrams tank program and the specific policies undertaken
by DOD.
C. SUBCONTRACTOR ANALYSIS
The analysis that follows examines key second-tier subcontractors in each of the
following industrial base segments: (1) electronics and optics, (2) complex machining,
(3) basic materials, (4) weapons, and (5) propulsion. Each firm provides key items or
services that make up the Abrams tank. A list of key subcontractors, parts
manufactured, and number of facilities utilized is contained in Table XIII.
1. Electronics and Optics
There are twelve major subcontractors that produce or are major suppliers
of electronics and optics for the Abrams tank. Examples of electronics and optics are
the fire control system, thermal imaging system, and turret electronics.
Recent trade studies indicate that there are about 200 optics firms in the U.S.
Of these 200 firms, there are about 30-40 that engage in over 80 percent of their
production for DOD. On the electronics side, there are about 100 electronics firms in
the U.S., with the majority of them providing varying levels of products or services to
DOD. Overall, these products represent advanced technology and have high costs. For
example, the Thermal Imaging System (TIS) on the Abrams costs over $100,000 per
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unit. These high unit costs make the products expensive for sale in the commercial
sector and so the market is limited, even though many law enforcement agencies would
like to possess thermal imaging equipment.
TABLE XIII
SUBCONTRACTOR COMPOSITION FOR THE ABRAMS TANK
Principal Tank Components Component Facilities
Electronics & Optics
Cadillac Gage Stabilization System and Turret Drive 2
Computing Devices of Canada Ballistic Computer and Flat Panel Display I
Electro Tech Slip Ring I
General Electric Radio Interface Unit
Hughes Aircraft Thermal Imaging System and Laser Rangefi'der I
J-Tech Associates Crosswind Sensor I
Singer Kearfott Line of Sight Data Link I
Kollmorgan Corporation Gunner's Auxiliary Sight and Commander's I
Weapons Station
Precision Sensors Pressure Sensors I
Smiths Industries Position/navigation Unit I
Texas Instruments Hull/Turret Electronics Unit and CITV I




Lukens Steel Corporation Armor Steel Plate I
Atchison Casting Corporation Cast Steel I
U.S. DOE DU Facility Depleted Uranium I
Weanons
Rock Island Arsenal Main Gun Mounts I
Watervliet Arsenal 120mm Cannon I
Propulsion
Textron Lycoming-SAEP (GOCO) Turbine 2ngme I
Allison Transmissions Transmission I
LOC Performance Final Drives I
Gibraltar Sprocket Company Sprockets I
Urdan Industries Limited Roadwheels I
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Track I
Donaldson and United Air Filters Air Filters 2
Bendix Corporation Starter 2
Vickers Corporation Hydraulic Pump I
Source: GDLS.
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Many of these firms export some of their products to foreign nations for use
in foreign weapon systems. "In the face of significant cuts in all defense programs, these
firms may have significant difficulties in finding markets for their products. "" It is
estimated that as tank program dollars shrink, more firms will terminate business
relationships with DOD. New firms for these products will require at least one to two
years for personnel training, equipment installation, testing, etc., before an adequate
supply of these advanced products can be obtained from new suppliers. If new suppliers
do not have the opportunity to advance along the learning curve via significant production
experience (as may be the case in the event demand for such products is reduced), the
feasibility of obtaining electro-optical products may be hindered.56
a. Cadillac Gage
Cadillac Gage is a subsidiary of Textron Incorporated and manufactures
the stabilization system and turret drive for the Abrams tank. It has two dedicated
facilities for Abrams component production and employs 500 personnel. Cadillac Gage
also manufactures the stabilization system for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) vehicles
which make up about half of its business. About 500 units are produced annually each
worth $70,000. Should tank production cease or taper off significantly, the management
of Cadillac Gage has "proposed to either shut down "ie two facilities or convert these for




200 per year from the present volume."57  Two hundred units is the minimum
economically feasible alternative under any option above foreign military sales for
Cadillac Gage to remain in business with the Abrams tank program.
b. Computing Devices of Canada
Computing Devices of Canada (CDC) manufactures the ballistic computer
and the flat panel display for the Abrams tank and is a division of Control Data Canada
Limited. It is a microelectronics product manufacturer specializing in computers. It is
also engaged in FMS with components provided to the British Challenger tank, other
foreign fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and shipboard displays. The management of CDC
plans to keep production lines for the Abrams open even if funding for Abrams is totally
cut, because the same production lines are used in other microelectronic product
manufacture. However, the absence of manufacturing activities for the Abrams
components "in excess of three years will result in significant atrophy in terms of the
Abrams tank product and process technology." 58
c. Hughes Aircraft
Hughes Aircraft Ground Combat Systems produces the Thermal Imaging
System (TIS) and Laser Rangefinder (LRF) for the Abrams tank. These electro-optical
products are two of five that Hughes produces for DOD. The TIS is a sight that allows






visibility by using the thermal signatures of animate and inanimate objects. The LRF
allows the gunner and tank commander to fire a laser beam to a target which returns a
range in meters that becomes part of the ballistic solution in the firing sequence. The TIS
represents cutting edge technology and is a fairly complex system. The complexity of
the TIS required the use of advanced products and process technologies, requiring at least
ten years to execute the research and development associated with the system. Only
Hughes' utilization of concurrent engineering in the manufacturing process and well-
established research and development base shortened the original research and
development effort. In addition t the long lead times, highly skilled personnel must
have experience in actual product manufacture and training, followed by qualification on
the production line. This process takes a minimum of eighteen months.
Hughes relies on over 100 third- and fourth-tier subcontractors for
components for the TIS and LRF with some of these firms being one-of-a-kind
manufacturing entities. Should funding for the Abrams reduce demand to 120 tanks per
year or less or ten tanks per month, Hughes plans to shut down the assembly line and
manufacture other products. If this happens, alternatives to Hughes are Honeywell,
Loral, Texas Instruments and Martin Marietta. But as was stated earlier, new firms for
these products will require at least one to two years for personnel training, equipment
installation, testing, etc., before an adequate supply of these advanced products can be
obtained from new suppliers. If new suppliers do not have the opportunity to advance
along the learning curve via significant production experience, the feasibility of obtaining
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electro-optical products may be hindered, especially if there is a sudden increase in
product demand given emergency conditions.
d. J-Tech Associates
J-Tech Associates manufactures the crosswind sensor for the tank. The
crosswind sensor measures wind speed and direction, which is one variable used in
computing the ballistic solution in the tank's ballistic computer. The crosswind sensor
was adopted from a commercial gas flow measuring instrument that J-Tech also
manufactures. The firm currently employs 65 personnel. About 50 percent of J-Tech
business is dedicated to Abrams crosswind sensor production. J-Tech purchases most of
the components of the sensor, which are primarily microelectronic components, from
third- and fourth-tier subcontractors. In the event J-Tech chooses to exit crosswind
sensor production, it is estimated that about 200 other firms would have the capability
to manufacture crosswind sensors.
e. Singer Kearfott
Singer Kearfott manufactures the Line-of-Sight (LOS) system for the
Abrams tank and 80 percent of its business is with DOD. The LOS links the physical
aspects of the main gun with the electro-optical functions of the fire control system on
the tank. Kearfott led the development of the LOS and continues to perfect and
incorporate LOS technology through its continuing research and development efforts.
Kearfott relies on over 50 third- and fourth-tier subcontractors and purchases all the
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components used to manufacture the LOS from these vendors. Again, some of these
vendors are unique product firms producing one-of-a-kind components.
Kearfott has indicated that it will continue to manufacture electro-optical
systems whether funding continues for the Abrams or not. If the demand for LOS
production drops below 324 units per year as compared to the current production of 840
units per year, and DOD is not willing to negotiate on higher per unit costs, then
Kearfott will close down the Abrams LOS production line.
f. Smiths Industries
Smiths Industries manufactures the position/navigational unit for the
M1A2 tank. The positional/navigational unit operates similar to the Global Positioning
System (GPS), except that the positional/navigational unit is integrated into various
command and control systems in the tank. The unit itself consists of several gyroscopes
combined with microelectronic components. The unit only represents 10 percent of
Smiths Industries annual sales and represents 90 percent of the firm's land navigation
product line. Smiths Industries purchases all of its components from third- and fourth-
tier subcontractors such as Motorola, Intel, etc. The firm employs 1650 personnel at one
facility and annual production is 380 units. The process technology for the unit is
relatively stable but the manufacturing processes are very labor intensive. 9 Because
of the labor intensive production process,
... the principal requirement for the maintenance of the industrial base for




is required because the manufacture of the gyroscopes is highly sensitive to
economies of scale.60
The minimal acceptable production rate for Smiths Industries is 240 units
per year compared to the current 380 units. If the minimal rate is decreased. Smiths
Industries plans to exit this product line, although other firms such as Kearfott, Litton
Systems and Honeywell have the capability to manufacture this unit if necessary. But
again, new firms for these products will require at least one to two years for personnel
training, equipment installation, testing, etc., before an adequate supply of these
advanced products can be obtained from new suppliers. If new suppliers do not have the
opportunity to acivance along the learning curve via significant production experience,
the feasibility of obtaining electro-optical products may be hampered.
g. Texas Instruments
Texas Instruments (TI) manufactures the Hull/Turret Electronics Unit
(H/TEU) for the Abrams tank. It also manufactures the Commander's Independent
Thermal Viewer (CITV) for the MIA2 tank. About 75-100 personnel assemble the
H/TEU with a larger number expected to assemble the CITV. A significant portion of
the TI personnel engaged in Abrams component production and testing are highly
experienced engineers and technicians.
In the event that funding for the Abrams is reduced or terminated, most
of these employees will likely be absorbed into other TI operations. It is also likely that





technological advances made to date because the microelectronic components "result from
broad, industry-wide, technological improvements as well as from the research and
development undertaken explicitly for the Abrams tank component."6 So in the event
production resumes, TI will be able to reinstate production of the H/TEU and CITV with
a slight delay. In sum, specific policies to preserve the industrial base for these
components is not necessary. The only requirement will be to keep a proper spare
components inventory.
h. Vista Controls
Vista Controls manufactures special purpose protot. pe c(mputers for
DOD land systems. It makes the stabilization computer for the Abrams which stabilizes
the firing mechanism during gunnery. The cost for this unit is $12,000. Vista Controls
employs 30 people with the majority of them dedicated to making the computer. All
components for the computer are purchased from vendors with Vista Controls performing
assembly and software integration. The management of Vista Controls is depending on
the continuous production of the Abrams through the proposed retrofit program to the
MIA2 in order to continue its product line. Should the prop "-i oe cancelled. Vista
Controls will revert to prototype assemblies for DOD and enter the commercial market.
2. Complex Machining
General Dynamics-Land Systems Division operates all tvaee complex




take place at the Lima Army Tank Plant (LATP), Scranton Complex Machining Plant,
and Detroit Army Tank Plant (DATP). Machining operations involve manufacture of
components such as roadwheel arms and rocary shock absorbers for the tank. DATP was
closed in October 1991 but 50 percent of gun mount production and assembly is still
being undertaken at DATP according to GDLS. This leaves LATP and the Scranton,
Pennsylvania Complex Machining Plant as the two key machining facilities in operation.
Conversion of any of these facilities to other operations in the event of closure is not
economically feasible nor are there any other facilities in the U.S. capable of undertaking
the complex machining tasks carried out by GDLS.
3. Basic Materials
Abrams tank production requires basic material inputs from three industry
segments. The industry segments are: (1) armored steel plate production, (2) large-scale
steel casting production, and (3) depleted uranium production.
a. Lukens Steel Corporation
Lukens Steel Corporation is the sole current producer of steel plate for
the Abrams program. Because of the relatively assured future supply of steel plate for
heavy armor, steel plate production can be started at any time but at significant cost in
the event of a future restart from production termination. The current industrial base for
armor plate is adequate to accommodate the downsizing tank industrial base and should
Lukens Steel exit the armor plate business, alternate producers for steel plate are
Bethlehem Steel, U.S. Steel, and Oregon Steel.
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b. Atchison Casting Corporation
Established in Atchison, Kansas in 1872, the Atchison Casting
Corporation is one of the largest steel foundries in the U.S. It has supplied GDLS since
1978 with sixteen separate steel castings such as turret rings for the Abrams. Steel
casting consists of casting followed by rough machining. Atchison Casting specializes
in large castings for locomotives and heavy construction equipment and can cast steel up
to 50,000 pounds in weight. Of its 600 employees, 50 percent are involved in Abrams
related production. A significant portion of the personnel employed by the firm are
highly skilled technicians, welders, melters, and process engineers. Due to these
developed skills, on-the-job training for large steel casting only exists at the Atchison
foundry.
Atchison Casting has continually upgraded its manufacturing production
capabilities with advanced equipment such as computer-assisted machinery for rough
machining and other technological advances. The annual minimum volume of production
is 240 units. At lower volumes, it will seek other markets for its products such as steam
turbines and will reconfigure the Abrams production line for other products. Possible
aiternatives to Atchison are FMC and the Birdsboro Foundry, although "Atchison Casting
has unique technical capabilities that will be difficult to duplicate."62 The Birdsboro
Foundry is a relative newcomer to steel casting and lacks the technical experience in steel




c. U.S. Deparnment of Energy Depleted Uranium Facility
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Depleted Uranium (DU) facility
was discussed in previous chapters. Closure costs as of December 1992 are $20 million.
If current DU armor package lines are terminated, restart from total layaway would take
approximately 42 months and cost $168 million. Although a one-of-a-kind facility, an
alternative to the DU facility is the Nuclear Metals Industries, in Concord,
Massachusetts.
By nature of design and usage, the armor package does not lend itself to mass
production on a commercial basis. Accordingly, to facilitize a commercial base,
considerable investment by the Government would be required.63
The Department of Defense can expect to pay a very high price to enable
this alternate subcontractor to produce DU armor for the Abrams tank. Combined with
closure costs and long lead times for future restart at the DOE facility, it is not
economically feasible to shut down the DOE DU facility.
4. Weapons
The only facility producing the 120mm cannon for the Abramns tank is
Watervliet Arsenal in New York. Watervliet is also the only facility capable of
producing large caliber gun tubes for all artillery and armor systems in the U.S. Rock
Island Arsenal produces the gun mount, breech mechanism, etc., for the main gun and
again is a unique facility. Rock Island produces 50 percent of the gun mounts for the
"
63U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command, 1992 Industrial Sector Study: Tracked
and Wheeled Vehicles, Warren, MI: Production Management Division of the Acquisition
Center (AMSTA-IC), 28 April 1992, p. 45.
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Abrams program while the remaining gun mounts are produced at DATP.6 Both
TACOM closure studies identified 129 personnel at Watervliet Arsenal and 410 personnel
at Rock Island Arsenal who would be affected given funding cutbacks in the Abrams
program. Both of these facilities are Government-owned and operated and closure of
these facilities is not expected. A reduction of operations may take place resulting in a
loss of skills and experience that have been the cornerstone of these facilities since the
early 1800's.
5. Propulsion
There are ten industrial entities that manufacture the components of the
Abrams tank propulsion system. As seen thus far in the previous four industrial
segments making up the tank industrial base, the firms providing the propulsion
components range from those with very large civilian sector markets who will not be
affected by changes in the Abrams tank program and those who are totally dependent on
tank contracts for survival in the marketplace.
a. Textron Lycoming
Textron Lycoming manufactures the AGT1500 gas turbine engine for the
Abrams tank at the Stratford Army Engine Plant (SAEP) in Stratford, Connecticut. The
plant is a Government-owned, contractor operated (GOCO) facility and is the only
facility where the engines are made. Textron's current industrial sales consist of 65
percent defense products and 35 percent commercial products. Textron supplies the
"6M.A. Puzzuoli, Memorandum/facsimile to the researcher from Manager, Quality
Programs, General Dynamics-Land Systems Division, 08 January 1993, p. 2.
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AGT1500 engine as Government Furnished Material (GFM) to DOD who provides it to
GDLS.
Textron currently produces 540 engines per year or 45 per month and
for mobilization purposes can ramp up production to 90 per month or 1080 engines per
year. Production lead time for engines is 23 months, since Textron must rely on over
60 third- awl fourth-tier subcontractors to provide parts and components for engine
production.
The gas turbine used in the Abrams tank is unique in that most other
heavy armor system.s such as the British Challenger and German Leopard II utilize diesel
engines for their power plants. Textron devoted considerable effort to the research and
development, engineering, and prototyping the gas turbine for use in the tank. The
uniqueness of the gas turbine versus the diesel engine also has forced Textron to stay
ahead of its competitors through continuing research and development efforts. "Much
of this research and development activity may be explained by the fact that there exists
fierce competition between gas turbine and diesel engine proponents in the future
propulsion units for the heavy armor. "'6 Textron has also expended significant effort
to equip its production lines with advanced manufacturing technology so as to keep per




Even if cutbacks in Abrams production take place, Textron's "potential
for exiting military business after 1994 is considered minimal."' There will still be a
need for spare engines for the tanks currently in the fleet. In any event, Textron has
considered downsizing and developing and/or marketing new products and technologies.
Should Textron exit tank engine production, an alternative subcontractor is General
Electric, which has had significant experience in gas turbine technology for civilian and
military applications.
b. Allison Transmissions
As a subdivision of General Motors, Allison Transmission Division
(ATD) manufactures the X1 100 trwismission for the Abrams tank. Allison dominates
the world's transmission market with over 80 percent of the total share. Its defense
business is only 25 percent of its total sales, with the remaining 75 percent dedicated to
commercial products. Allison manufactures the transmission at its four million square
foot plant in Indianapolis, Indiana which was built in 1979. This p!ant maintains one
assembly line for each transmission type produced. Of the 5700 employees at the ATD
plant, 800 are currently dedicated to X1 100 production. SC-he of the technical skills
required by these employees working in the manufacture of transmissions require several
years on-the-job training adding to production lead times in the event of production
restart from a reduced capacity. The production line has a capability of producing 120
transmissions per month and it is currently operating the line at 45 percent capacity.
"6TACOM, 1992 Industrial Sector Study, p. 47.
93
Production lead time is 300 days for normal production and 570 days from total layaway.
Allison purchases parts and components for the X1 100 transmission from over 60 third-
and fourth-tier subcontractors, several who represent one of a few manufacturing entities
capable of supplying specific products for the transmission.
Allison must continually undertake research, development, and
engineering for its transmission technology resulting in constant improvements to the
Abrams transmission. This is also a direct result of attempts by foreign firms to increase
their own market share of transmission business at ATD's expense with the competition
coming from Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan. This technological edge also
gives the transmission the built in flexibility for use with diesel or turbine technology,
as presented in Textron Lycoming's situation where fierce competition exists between gas
turbine and diesel engine proponents.
In September 1992, the Treasury Department's Committee on Foreign
Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS) cleared the way for a German corporation,
Zahnradfabrik Friedrichshafen AG(ZF) to purchase ATD.67 Although the sale should
be finalized in 1993, this has now raised Congress' concerns over the investment in IT.S.
defense industries by foreign entities and raises potential national security implications
of mergers and acquisitions with foreign companies. In this instance, since ATD
manufactures almost all of the U.S. Army's transmissions, the sale may have a
significant impact on the decisions being made to preserve the tank industrial base.
67Michael Sperling, "U.S. Congressman Questions GM Sale," Defense News, 11-17
January 1993, p. 25.
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Allison expects to remain in business regardless of what happens to the
Abrams progroam and should production be reduced, DOD should expect higher unit
production overhead costs. Additionally there will be a need for spares in the future so
a minimum requirement for transmissions can be anticipated.
c. LOC Performance
LOC Performance manufactures the final drive for the Abrams tank. The
final drive is the unit which converts power from the transmission through the overfitting
hbb and sprocket which directly drives the track. Each tank has two final drives. LOC
Performance is a machine shop dedicated to final drive production for the Abrams tank,
with 90 percent of its business dedicated to DOD contracts and the remaining 10 percent
dedicated to commercial sales. Final drive output at LOC Performance is 1700 units per
year or enough final drives for 850 tanks. Production lead time for final drives is 360
days. LOC Performance represents a "typical relatively small metalworking enterprise,
engaged in the machining operations of various metal components for various large
firms.'"6 The design and engineering requirements for the firnal drive are provided by
GDLS, so no research and development is conducted by LOC Performance. LOC
Performance relies on no outside suppliers for parts and components for the final drive.
At least five active producers exist in the U.S. that could readily
undertake final drive production in the event LOC exits this market. Again, new firms
for final drives will require some time to train personnel, install equipment, testing, etc.,
68Gutmanis, p. 110.
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before an adequate supply of these advanced products can be obtained from new
suppliers. If new suppliers do not have the opportunity to advance along the learning
curve via significant production experience, the feasibility of obtaining final drives in an
emergency may be hindered. Overall, there is no significant industrial base problem in
final drive production.
d. Gibrautar Sprocket Company
The Gibraltar Sprocket Company manufactures the sprockets tor the
Abrams tank. The sprocket is mounted to the rear hub which is connected to the final
drive. The power is then transferred from the engine through the transmission, final
drives, hubs, sprockets and finally tracks. There are a total of four sprockets on a tank.
There are only two sprocket companies in the U.S. with the other
sprocket company being the Wisconsin Ordnance Works. Gibraltar produces sprockets
for the Abrams and other tracked vehicles in the Army's inventory and so its business
mix is 95 percent DOD business with the remaining five percent in commercial sales.
The production facility is currently operating at 80 percent capacity and production lead
thne for sprockets is 180 days to produce 960 sprockets per month.
It is unlikely that Gibraltar will exit sprocket business in the event of
Abrams production termination, but if a major reduction in defense expenditures takes
place, it is anticipated that the company will restructure its operations. Currently there
is no foreseeable problem maintaining an adequate industrial base for sprockets.
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Gibraltar is the supplier for all combat vehicles and there will be a demand for spares,
"so they have no intention of closing their facility."69
e. Urdan Industries
Urdan Industries Limited, is an Israeli firm which manufactures the
roadwheel for the Abrams tank along with roadwheels for most U.S. and foreign tracked
vehicles. Its U.S. subsidiary, Suspension & Parts Industries, Limited, maintains a U.S.
office which handles the contract and administrative work for U.S. contracts. In reality,
Urdan buys unfinished aluminum roadwheel castings in the U.S., ships them to Israel
where the rubber rims are applied and wheels refinished, and then ships them back to the
U.S. Abrams roadwheels represent 40 percent of Urdan's production.
The roadwheels are a part of the suspension system used on tracked
vehicles. They keep the track in alignment during its revolution; they are mounted on
suspension arms which are connected to torsion bars. When the tracked vehicle is in
motion, the roadwheel rides on the inner surface of the track shoe.
Urdan produces 3000 roadwheels per month or 36,000 per year. Since
the Abrams utilizes 28 roadwheel in the suspension system, that would equ.-t, to enough
roadwheels for 1,286 tanks. Of the annual production, between 20 percent and 40
percent is dedicated spares production. Urdan relies on nine active suppliers in the U.S.
for roadwheel technology such as forging, machining, melting, stamping and heat
treating. If the Abrams program is reduced by at least 60 percent, it is expected that
69TACOM, 1992 Industrial Sector Study, p. 58.
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three to five of these suppliers would exit defense business. The ramifications for
Abrams then is that all production processes involving roadwheel production would
become totally dependent on a foreign firm since Urdan maintains the capability to
manufacture the roadwheel entirely in Israel.
f. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company is the principal track manufacturer
for most U.S. tracked vehicles. The track is the last component in the vehicle's drive
system. Driven by the sprockets and guided by the roadwheels, it is the contact point
to the ground and enables the vehicle to move. The track manufacturing process requires
forging, casting, heat treating, machining and rubberizing. The Abrams track utilizes
the T158 track with a total of 156 shoes. Goodyear maintains 60 percent of its business
with DOD and the remaining 40 percent in commercial sales. Goodyear has the ability
to produce 25,000 shoes per month and is currently operating the track assembly line at
75 percent capacity. It can reach 25,000 shoes per month given a production lead time
of 180 days. Currently of the 550 employees in its track manufacturing facility, 183 are
engaged in Abrams track production.
Goodyear performs fimal track production by rubberizing and assembling
the metal track. Goodyear relies on FMC Corporation for the metal track components.
Manufacture of the track by use of forging technology is a complex technology and the
FMC facility is periodically upgraded with advanced forging equipment. FMC's
production lead time for tooling and molds is 60 days. Most of the cost of track is
attributed to the dies required to produce the track. Carbo Tools is FMC's diemaker and
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it too, requires at least 60 days production lead time to manufacture the dies for the T158
track.
Low level production for track is economically unfeasible to Goodyear
since this level of production for tanks would equate to less than one month's production
of track for Goodyear. Manufacturing spares for the Abrams is acceptable only if two
conditions are met: (1) appropriate minimum production of track spares is undertaken,
and (2) the manufacturing activities of spares are allowed to be undertaken at a relatively
constant level throughout the production period.7° Even at current volumes, the track
production industry is struggling with marginal profits and in many cases experiencing
losses because most worn track is refurbished at Army depots and reissued back to the
tank fleet rather than discarded, making new track procurement necessary only for new
tanks.
g. Donaldson Company and United Air Cleaner Company
Donaldson Company and the United Air Cleaner Company are the only
produces of air filters for the Abrams tank. The air filter is a non-repairable component
which cleans the ambient air prior to entry into the engine and is critical to engine
performance. The Abrams tank utilizes three air filters or V-packs.
(1) Donaldson Company. The Donaldson Company maintains four
percent of its business with DOD contracts and the remaining 96 percent in commercial




operating at two percent capacity with direct sales to GDLS at 100 air filters per month.
Facing a slowdown or complete production termination, Donaldson is planning to
dissolve its Abrams air filter production line.
(2) United Air Cleaner Company. The United Air Cleaner company
maintains 80 percent of its business with DOD contracts and the remaining 20 percent
in commercial sales. United Air Cleaner Company has the capability to produce 2240
air filters per month but is currently operating at 77 percent capacity with direct sales to
GDLS at 1728 air filters per month. Since the current contract is about to expire and
there are no new contracts pending for air filters with United Air Cleaner Company, it
is planning to dissolve its Abrams air filter production line.
With the Donaldson and United Air Companies both about to exit the
Abrams air filter production, the production base will erode, although a four- to seven-
year supply of air filters exists. Only continued production of tanks or a stepped up
demand for spares will enable both firms to remain in this production sector. This will
become critical to sustaining the operational fleet in the future, especially if tanks are
once again deployed to harsh desert environments where consumption of air filters is high
causing unforecasted demands.
h. Bendix Corporation
Bendix, Engine Controls Division, manufactures the starter for the
Abrams at two facilities. The hydromechanical components are produced in Rocky
Mount, North Carolina by 20 personnel and the electronic components are produced in
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San Diego, California by 130 personnel. Annual starter production has been 900 units.
Bendix also manufactures commercial starters and other types of electronic controls for
General Electric, Allison, and other firms. Abrams work constitutes 50 percent of
Bendix business.
Bendix relies on over 20 third- and fourth-tier subcontractors for its
components but none of these vendors are unique because many of the components for
the starter have civil applications as well as military applications. Starter technology has
advanced primarily from analog to digital technology and some modernization in
manufacturing processes has taken place. The number of firms capable of producing the
starter for the tank are numerous should Bendix exit starter production. Therefore,
sustaining this segment of the tank industrial base does not seem to be an issue.
i. Vickers Corporation
Vickers Corporation is a large industry engaged in the research and
development, engineering, and production of hydraulic pumps for numerous weapons
systems and commercial applications. The manufacture of hydraulic pumps involves
three metal forming operations: casting, forging, and machining. Annual production of
Abrams pumps is 750 units which represents about 2 percent of total Vickers production.
The technology used in hydraulic pumps is advanced, but the hydraulic
pumps used on the Abrams do not utilize this technology For example, tank hydraulic
pumps are designed for a pressure of 3000 psi, whereas a number of other hydraulic
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pumps manufactured by Vickers exceed 8000 psi.7' Additionally, the tank hydraulic
pump is almost identical to civilian pumps. Pump manufacture utilizes advanced
production processes, so in order to stay competitive, Vickers has kept the most
advanced production techniques on the Abrams production line in order to improve
quality and ensure production efficiency. Vickers has few outside vendors so it does not
need to sustain a third- or fourth-tier subcontractor base.
It is expected that Vickers will remain in business regardless of decisions
affecting the outcome of future tank production. Should Vickers choose to leave Abrams
hydraulic pump production, there are at least 20 or more vendors who can manufacture
pumps for the Abrams.
D. SUMMARY OF THE TANK SUBCONTRACTOR BASE
As stated earlier in this chapter, the subcontractor base for the Abrams tank
contains firms ranging from those totally dependent on tank production for survival to
multiproduct firms manufacturing components and end items for both DOD and
commercial markets. The technologies between the five industrial segments vary from
complex electronics and optics to bulk steel plate production influencing factors such as
production lead times, personnel training and qualification, and manufacturing equipment
and processes.
The options available to DOD, Congress and industry for preserving the tank




1. OPTION ONE: The Army should mothball the Lima, Ohio tank plant
after the last Abrams tank is built.
This plan would include a complete layaway of LATP, extensive employee
layoffs and termination of tank production. The industrial facilities utilized by GDLS
would be retained and equipment stored in place.
At the subcontractor level, tank production termination would break up the
tank industrial base in its current configuration. The complex machining industrial
segment, which is run by GDLS, would close with LATP's closure. The loss of skills
and production processes along with advances in production technology would be lost in
the complex machining segment.
The basic materials industrial segment would be devastated with the loss of
the sole DU facility in the U.S. The armor steel plate and steel casting firms would
leave DOD business entirely with no guarantee of their return in the future.
The electro-optical segment would be hardest hit at the, third- and fourth-tier
subcontractor level where many firms at this level are firms totally dedicated to making
one-of-a kind products fuv" the second-tier tank subcontractors. At the electro-optical
second-tier subcontractor level, the loss of skills and production processes for Abrams
specific components would be lost but at least the skills and technologies would be
maintained in other DOD and commercial contracts. Again, some of these firms would
most likely exit DOD business with no guarantee of returning at a future date. Weapons
manufacture at the two arsenals would likely be degraded with the loss of skills and
experience that has beeo the characteristic of these facilities since the turn of the century.
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Finally, propulsion systems would probably be least affected out of the five
industrial segments with the exception of a few firms such as air filter producers, because
many of the propulsion systems have commercial applications which can be transferred
back to a future tank program if necessary and the military-civilian business base mix is
enough to offset the loss of the Abrams program. In conclusion, the termination of
Abrams production would have far-reaching and detrimental effects on the subcontractor
base.
2. OPTION TWO: The Army should reduce production to the minimum
production rate that will keep the plant operational until the plant retools
for the next generation tank.
This option is based on a trickle production rate which sustains a minimal
production process, critical equipment and skills and provides for an orderly expansion
to full-rate production in an emergency. The analysis suggests that with a few
exceptions, the tank subcontractors will remain viable industrial entities and will be able
to provide products and services for the Abrams program if the minimum production rate
is ten tanks per month. Specific firms that expect to suffer with trickle rate production
are Goodyear (track), Donaldson (air filters), Hughes (TIS/LRF), and GDLS (complex
machining).
At the second-, third-, and fourth-tier levels, the type of component made is
directly related to the business decisions being made regarding trickle production. The
firms that favor trickle production manufacture products that are similar to goods
manufactured for other DOD systems and commercial products while those opposed to
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trickle production are totally reliant on Abrams production. Those firms that exit
Abrams component production due to uneconomical production rates will have to be
replaced, and the effects on sensitive industrial segments such as electro-optics will be
that significant delays of one to two years will be experienced for personnel training,
equipment installation, testing, etc., before an adequate supply of these advance products
can be obtained from new suppliers. If new suppliers do not have the opportunity to
advance along the learning curve via significant production experience, the feasibility of
obtaining these products may be hindered."2
Most subcontractors fear that production rates below ten tanks per month will
result in erosion of technical personnel and a low return on their capital equipment
resulting in closure of the production line. Also, the fixed overhead costs would have
to be allocated to fewer production units forcing per unit prices for tanks to be raised.
This will likely be difficult to execute in the current budget climate. From the
contracting aspect, the lower rates leading to higher per unit costs would force contract
renegotiations at all tiers of the tank industrial base for products and services. The end




3. OPTION THREE: The Army should complete production of the MIA1
tank and then use the factory to retrofit/upgrade older model tanks to
the M1A2 tank.
This option bridges the M1/M1A1 to the Block III tank by incorporating
emerging technologies into the M1A2 or Block II tank. With minor exceptions, this is
the most preferred option for the subcontractor base because it maintains the tank
industrial base in its current configuration. The engine-Textron and transmission-Allison
manufacturers will be forced to reduce operations because the M1A2 program will utilize
refurbished MI/M1A1 hulls and propulsion systems although there will still be a spares
requirement. Since Allison dominates the world's transmission market and Textron has
35 percent of its business in commercial markets, this reduction should not affect their
business base and will allow them to surge production in the event of an emergency.
The remaining second-, third-, and fourth-tier subcontractors can continue
production, incorporate new technologies in the tank components, and refine
mianufacturing processes. The result is that an established tank industrial base will enable
the U.S. to provide the most advanced tank in the world to the U.S. Army and will also
enable DOD to sustain the necessary infrastructure required to develop and field future
main battle tanks.
In conclusion, the course of action which best preserves the subcontractor
base is Option Three. Trickle rate production in Option Two would steadily erode the
tank industrial base resulting in slow elimination of the tank industrial base over time.
Tank production termination in Option One would cause irrevocable damage to the
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subcontractor base and limit future options available to DOD, Congress and industry for
preserving the tank industrial base and developing future armored weapons systems.
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VI. MOBILIZATION AND SPARE PARTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze mobilization and spare parts isstues as they
apply to the tank industrial base and relate the three options for preserving the tank
industrial base to these issues.
B. MOBILIZATION OVERVIEW
Mobilization in World War II was best characterized as a "short-range problem
motivated by large-scale combat.""" This conception of the mobilization process
assumed that the industrial base would be capable of rapidly converting into an arsenal
of democracy and thus became a component of U.S. national security strategy during the
Cold War years. But this conception was changed when President Reagan, in his 1988
national security strategy report to Congress, stated that mobilization was only a
supporting capability for deterrence and the flexible response strategy.' This
interpretation of mobilization was further solidified when the Soviet Union and Warsaw
Pact were dissolved and the U.S. now faced potentially varied threats with different p
capabilities around the world. Regardless of the type of threat, the mobilization planning
"
73James Blackwell, Deterrence in Decay: The Future of the U.S. Defense Industrial
Base, The final report of the CSIS Defense Industrial Base Project, Washington, D.C.:




process consists of a variety of activities, the first of which is the development of specific
policies for the conduct of the industrial preparedness program.
1. The Mobilization Process
The industrial p~eparedness planning process consists of a variety of
activities, the first of which is the development of specific policies for the conduct of the
industrial preparedness program. The Defense Guidance from the Secretary of Defense
generally establishes a policy for the conduct of the industrial preparedness program.
Each year, the Unified and Specified Commanders submit a list of critical weapon
systems and components to the Joint Staff. This data is used to develop a single
prioritized list of critical weapon systems and components (CINC CIL). Each military
Service then develops its own annual list of critical weapon systems and components,
based in part on the data provided by the Joint Staff. The Services' selections are then
incorporated into the Industrial Preparedness Planning List (IPPL).
a. Industrial Preparedness Planning List
The IPPL is divided into two sections. Major weapon systems such as
tanks are listed in Section I while major components such as engines are listed in Section
IH. The components requiring vertical planning are listed under the appropriate weapon
system or end item, and those cc nmon to more than one system are so identified. The
IPPL also lists the end user and DOD organization responsible for the specific industrial
preparedness planning. Each service must submit its IPPL to the Deputy Undersecretary
of Defense for Industrial and International Programs and the Defense Logistics Agency
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(DLA), which then develop their own IPPL. The weapon systems and components listed
are included in surge and mobilization plans.
b. Objectives of Mobilization Planning
The objectives of mobilization planning are to realistically plan the total
requirement for post-mobilization day (M-day) production of the critical weapon systems
and items listed in the IPPL and identify planned emergency producers. The planning
can be accomplished by any one of four methods. They are (1) DD Form 1519, (2) Data
Item Description (DID), (3) Direct Industrial Base Plan (DIBP) and (4) special studies.75
The DD Form 1519 method is used to accomplish production planning
with firms that have voluntarily entered into the Industrial Preparedness Planning
Program (IPPP). This method begins with the acquisition activity or applicable, program
office determining the total planning requirement for a specific weapon system or
component through the use of production planning schedules that are verified by the
Armed Services Procurement Planning Officer (ASPPO) and the firm's Industrial Plant
Representative (IPR). This verification, along with a plant survey, is recorded on DD
Form 1519, down through subcontractor level. The program office or acquisition
activity then reviews all proposed industrial preparedness measures and communicates
the disposition of the proposals to the planned producer through the ASPPO.
75Defense Systems Management College, Integrating Industrial Preparedness Into the
Acquisition Process, A Guide for Program Managers, First Edition, Fort Belvoir, VA:
DSMC, April 1989, p. 4-2.
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The DID method is executed through DOD contracts since most contracts
mandate that information b'ý provided to the acquisition activity or program office
pertaining to industrial preparedness. Acceptance of the DID is a contractual obligation.
The acquisition activity or program office must specify the required level of surge and
mobilization production and necessary overall planning to execute the surge or
mobilization. A contractor becomes a planned producer by executing the agreement
contained on the DD Form 1519 under the DID method. The ASPPO will allocate plant
capacity on the basis of the response to the DID requirement.
The acquisition activity or program office may choose to conduct
industrial preparedness planning directly with a selected prime contractor instead of
having to go through the ASPPO. This method is known as the DIBP method and under
this method, the acquisition activity performs the functions of the ASPPO.
The last mobilization planning method is the execution of special studies.
DOD components may choose to gather industrial preparedness data by simply
conducting a special study. At the conclusion of the study the facility ASPPO, with
concurrence of the acquisition activity or program office, coordinates plant capability
allocation and completes plant loading records.
c. Objectives of Surge Planning
Surge planning consists of an in-depth assessment of the cost and effort
required to rapidly increase peacetime production rates within the limits of the
contractor's existing operations. In the case of the Abrams tank, the surge rate is 120
tanks per month from a current 20 tanks per month. During Desert Shield/Storm, tank
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production did not surge although many tank subcontractors were required to surge
production in order to meet the increased demand in spare parts for the operational tank
fleet. The surge effort identifies actions required to ensure significant production rate
increases within six months for consumables and within twelve months for major
weapons systems.
The surge planning process includes, but is not limited to, an examination of
the need for long lead time components, special tools and test equipment, component
prefabrication, skilled manpower, and storage space to store long lead time and
prefabricated components. Production plans are updated annually for surge items on the
IPPL or when requirements change significantly. Plans for all other items are updated
every two years.
Policy development is followed by the selection of the items and weapon
systems that will be included in the preparedness plans, as well as identifying the planned
producers of the systems. Government and industry planners, the Armed Services
Production Planning Officer (ASPPO) and the Industrial Preparedness Representative,
respectively are then assigned to those systems and industrial facility surveys are
conducted.
Execution of mobilization and surge plans is governed through the concept
of Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR). The GMR concept suggests actions and
options that should be considered in a given crisis stage. This concept does not replace
the numerous mobilization policies, plans and laws in place but provides a framework
into which many different actions that may be performed by different agencies can be
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inserted to check fcr logic, sequencing, and similar matters.76 The GMR program is
based on a concept described by the term Industrial Alert Condition (INDCONN. This
concept was envisioned as a shorthand description for a large number of different
emergency measures that increases industrial responsiveness or reallocates manpower
rssources and "suggests actions and options that should be considered at each crisis
stagi,."07 The INDCON levels progress from basic peacetime level through surge and
total mobilization of national resources.
Although it is unlikely that the U.S. will undergo a total mobilization similar
to the World War IH experience, the likelihood of surging production to meet a
contingency or short-fused crisis seems high given the nature of the current threats.
Additionally, surges in production are only one step of several leading up to total
mobilization. For these reasons, this analysis will emphasize surges in production rather
than total mobilization.
C. SPARE PARTS OVERVIEW
Readiness and repair parts availability are interdependent and in order to ensure the
capability to be flexibly responsive in a crisis, a 60-day stockage of spare parts should
be maintained for the operational tank fleet. Spare parts availability for the Abrams tank
is limited even though production of the tank continues. This became very clear during




Dynamics Land System (GDLS) stocks scheduled for Abrams tank production in order
to support the 1,904 MIA1 and 120 M1 tanks deployed in the Persian Gulf.78 The
items ranged from engines, transmissions, gunner's primary sights, thermal receiver
units, electronic boxes to final drives and road wheels. Having to borrow stocks from
production leaves a question concerning the capability of the war reserve to support a
future contingency.
A war reserve analysis for TACOM tracked and wheeled vehicle items shows that
of the required $536 million in consumable parts required to sustain the fleet in a 60-day
contingency, only $96 million is funded. Table XIV shows a partial breakdown of the
war reserve requirements for the tracked vehicle sector.
TABLE XIV
PARTIAL ABRAMS TANK WAR RESERVE ANALYSIS
Stock Item Lead ltme (Meaths) War Requhrtment War Reserw Stocks (Each)i
Admin + Product - Fundcl/Unfunded Stock On Hand/Due In
FRgmnc o.0 + 21.5 = 27.5 350/0 111254
Tranismission 9.0 + 15.0 = 24.0 46710 303/164
Fdters 100 + 115 = 21.5 110510 110510
Track 8.0 + 11.5 = 19.5 80214/0 58012122202
Sprockets 1.5 + 8.0 = 9.5 642/6369 01642
Fnmal Drive 11.0 + 13.0 = 24.0 237150 17610
Source: Military Industrial Base Sector Study.
Table XIV indicates the total lead time (administration lead time plus plant
production lead time), war reserve funding requirements, and war reserve stockage on
7'MG(Ret) Oscar Decker, Joseph Aquino and Stephen D. Napier, Military Industrial
Base Sector Study, Tracked and Wheeled Vehicles, Final Report from the Independent




hand versus due in from the vendor. Lead times for these items ranged from 9.5 months
for sprockets to 27.5 months for engines. Despite the fact that some items are 100
percent funded, there are actual parts shortages on hand. For example, as of April 1992,
sprockets were showing 642 funded and 6369 unfunded requirements with no stocks on
hand. In sum, the criticality of the war reserve stockage levels has direct impact on the
readiness of the operational fleet and must be weighed against the options to preserve the
tank industrial base.
D. ANALYSIS
The following discussion evaluates the three previously discussed options for
preserving the industrial base with respect to surge requirements and spare parts. Figure
6 below summarizes all three options in a timeline which shows the time required to
begin surge from total layaway (Option One) and time required to begin surge from the
warm base (Options Two and Three). In all cases, the surge production rate is 120 tanks
per month.
1. OPTION ONE: The Army should mothball the Lima, Ohio tank plant
after the last Abrams tank is built.
This plan would include a complete layaway of the Lima Army Tank Plant
(LATP), extensive employee layoffs and termination of tank production. The industrial
facilities utilized by GDLS would be retained and equipment stored in place. At the
subcontractor level, tank production termination would break up the tank industrial base
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Figure 6 Production Surge to 120 Tanks
Source: Decker.
a. Surge Requirements
As stated earlier, the surge capacity for the Abrams tank is 120 tanks per
month with a current production mix of 90 MIA1 and 30 M1A2 tanks. In the 1990
Abrams Program Closure Study, it was determined that the time to reach a surge rate
from total layaway would be 51 months for the first vehicle to be produced and 72
months for the surge rate to be attained. This assumes that the Depleted Uranium (DU)
facility is closed for more than two years since the restart efforts beyond the two year
mark are significantly higher. A m-re detailed discussion of the two-year breakpoint is
discussed in detail in Chapter IV. Should the surge requirement be executed if the DU




would be 33 months for the first vehicle to be produced and 56 months for the surge rate
to be attained.
b. Spare Parts
The biggest disadvantage from total layaway of the tank industrial base
is that the critical back up for Class IX spares will not exist. Desert Shield/Storm has
already shown that Abrams funded and on hand stocks, as well as war reserve stocks,
were not adequate to support the Abrams fleet deployed in the Persian Gulf.
Additionally, since the layaway scenario shows a response time of 72 months to attain
a surge rate, the sub-sector suppliers will require "at least 48 months to fill the pipeline,
(plant management to qualify vendors, vendors to order material, vendors to produce
First Article Test (FAT) pieces, evaluate and pass FAT), and finally start production to
fill their plant pipeline."79 The 1990 Abrams Program Closure Study estimated that the
spares pricing would rise between 50 percent and 100 percent of the original cost in a
total layaway scenario because some subsectors would become totally reliant on spares
production once vehicle production ended. Without a warm tank industrial base, parts
availability can evolve into a major logistical crisis unless there are adequate war reserve
stocks. Since the war reserves are already lacking, it will be difficult to reach 100
percent war reserve stockage levels due to normal operating and maintenance demands.
"Decker, p. 9.
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2. OPTION TWO: The Army should reduce production to the minimum
production rate that will keep the factory operational until the factory
retools for the next generation tank.
This option is based on a trickle production rate which sustains a minimal
production process, critical equipment and skills, and provides for an orderly expansion
to full-rate production in an emergency. In this case the minimal production rate is ten
tanks per month.
a. Surge Requirements
In the 1990 Abrams Program Closure Study, it was determined that the
time to reach a surge rate from a minimum production rate of ten tanks per month would
be 22 months for the first vehicle to be produced and 47 months for the surge rate to be
attained. This surge capability is significantly better than that found in Option One since
production processes, critical equipment, critical skills, and certifications are already in
place allowing for a more efficient expansion to full-rate production.
b. Spare Pads
The advantages of maintaining a warm base are that spare parts and
assembly production are available in an emergency and lead times are reduced since
continued production eliminates all the requirements to qualify vendors and conduct FAT
tests on components and assemblies. The 1990 Abrams Program Closure Study estimated
that spares pricing would rise between 25 percent and 50 percent of the original cost in
118
a minimum production scenario because some subsectors would be more reliant on spares
production once vehicle production was reduced.
3. OPTION THREE: The Army should complete production of the MiA1
tank and then use the factory to retrofit/upgrade older model tanks to
the M1A2.
This option bridges the MI/M1A1 to the Block III or Future Main Battle
Tank (FMBT) by incorporating emerging technologies into the M1A2 or Block II tank.
The reconversion rate is 20 tanks per month.
a. Surge Requirements
In the 1990 Abrams Program Closure Study, it was determined that the
time to reach a surge rate from a normal production rate of 20 tanks per month would
be 22 months for the first vehicle to be produced and 45 months for the surge rate to be
attained. The differences between the minimum sustaining rate found in Optior. Two and
the normal production rate in this option are marginal. In fact, normal production rates
of 30 tanks per month to the surge rate of 120 tanks per month are 21 months to the first
vehicle and 40 months for the surge rate to be attained. Again, the key factor in this
option is that production processes, critical equipment, critical skills, and required
certifications are already in place, allowing for a more efficient expansion to full-rate
production.
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b. Spare Parts
As described in previous chapters, it is more economical to produce tanks
at rates of 20 per month than in lesser numbers. For example, in FY94, the cost of ten
MIAI tanks with no production of MlA2 tanks would be $6.6 million per unit. But if
10 MiAls and 20 M1A2s were built in FY94, the cost per MIAl would drop to $3.9
million each and the cost of the MIA2 would be $5.3 million per unit. This drop in per
unit costs would be reflected in the corresponding prices for spare parts. As stated
earlier, spares pricing when no tank production is taking place would be 50 to 100
percent above spares pricing during normal production, while spares pricing at trickle
rate production would be 25 to 50 percent above normal production spares pricing.80
Again, the advantages of maintaining a warm base are that spare parts and assembly
production are available in an emergency and lead times are reduced since continued
production eliminates all the requirements to qualify vendors, and conduct FAT tests on
components and assemblies.
E. SUMMARY
Of the three options to preserve the industrial base, the best option is to maintain
a warm base by either executing Option Two or Option Three. Of these two options,
the 20 tanks per month production/conversion rate to the MIA2 is better, since normal
production is economically better than trickle rate production. Option Three and Option
"sTU.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command, Abrams Program Closure Study, Warren,
MI: Unpublished Slides, September 1990, Slides ICC 19.2, ICC 15.6.
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Two give the tank industrial base a better capability to surge production in an emergency
by surging production from 21 months to full-rate production at 45 months. Surge rates
from total layaway would require 51 months to the first tank and 76 months to full-rate
production.
Spare parts availability are severely impacted by total layaway. Given the
criticality of spare parts on hand and war reserves, total layaway would place the
readiness posture of the operational tank fleet in jeopardy especially should another
Persian Gulf scenario take place. Again, it would be best to execute reconversion to the
M1A2 in order to keep spares prices in check and insure adequate stockage of parts on
hand.
From a surge and mobilization standpoint, it is critical that the industrial base be
preserved. Concurrently, a spares inventory and war reserve capability must be
maintained to sustain the operational tank fleet and enable the armor force to support
itself in a short-fused crisis situation. By maintaining a warm base, the flexibility
remains to execute responsive production surges while supporting the existing armor
force.
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VII. OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS CONSIDERATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
While Chapter IV examined the options available to DOD, Congress, and industry
to preserve the industrial base from a cost aspect, the purpose of this chapter is to
address the issue from an operational effectiveness viewpoint.
The criteria used to evaluate the operational effectiveness of each option for
preserving the tank industrial base include: (1) force mix and structure, (2) technological
superiority, (3) logistical support requirements, (4) training and doctrine, and (5) Foreign
Military Sales (FMS).
B. EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
This section addresses the factors of operational effectiveness, through each of the
three previously discussed options to preserve the tank industrial base, and how the
factors are directly influenced by the three options.
1. OPTION ONE: The Army should mothball the Lima, Ohio tank plant
after the last Abrams tank is built.
This plan would include a complete layaway of Lima Army Tank Plant
(LATP), extensive employee layoffs and tank production termination after the first phase
of the MIA2 retrofit is completed in 1995. The industrial facilities utilized by General
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Dynamics-Land Systems Division (GDLS) would be retained and equipment stored in
place.
a. Force Mix and Structure
The force mix and structure is marginally impacted by the addition of
272 M1A2 tanks to the armor force because these 272 tanks would only comprise 3.3
percent of all tanks in the inventory. These M1A2s would equip between four to five
armor battalions of 58 tanks each or roughly 1.5 heavy divisions. These numbers do not
account for tanks that would be required for overseas prepositioning, maintenance float
vehicles, and training tanks for the Armor School, etc. In this case, actual deployable
numbers in the field would even be lower.
Additionally, the Army has implicitly designated the 2164 MI 105mm
Abrams tanks as a tank of last resort. During Desert Shield, the Army chose to
transition almost all of the Mls in the Persian Gulf to the MiA1 up to the day that the
ground offensive was launched by the coalition forces. The next war will probably see.
few if any MI or MIIP tanks in combat, with the preponderance of the armor force
being M1Al's.
b. Technological Superiority
The Axmy's modernization strategy is compromised because production
termination after the initial reconversion program will give some potential adversaries
superior weapon systems compared to those held by the U.S. At least 59 percent of the
armor force will have the MIA1 with only four percent possessing the M1A2, resulting
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in the bulk of the front-line or forward deployed armor force being equipped with the
MIAL. Examples of this technological gap are already evident as the U.S. Government
has approved the sale of 760 M1A2s to Kuwait and 700 M1A2s to Saudi Arabia and
several European allies and Japan are marketing equal or potentially better tanks to
various other nations.
c. Logistical Support Requirements
In addition to the costs required to manage the tank industrial base, it is
important to note that the majority of the operational Abrams fleet is already between 10
and 15 years old and that increased Operation & Maintenance (O&M) funds will be
required to sustain this fleet as it ages if no new or refurbished tanks are fielded after
1995. The force mix given production termination is contained in Table XV.
TABLE XV
ABRAMS FORCE MIX
Option MI MIIP MIAI MIA2 Total
Production Termination in 1995 2164 894 4802 272 8132
Full Upgrade 1372 894 4802 1064 8132
Source: GDLS.
This mix would require a spare parts and maintenance base for 272
M1A2s in the Army's inventory. This would likely contribute to higher O&M costs
because the spare parts demands for such a small number of systems would be difficult
to track especially if the tanks were geographically scattered around the United States or
deployed overseas. It would also place a burden on industry as they would be required
to produce small amounts of spares at less than economical rates to sustain this MlA2
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fleet. Table XV does not account for the estimated 5000 M60 tanks still in the Army's
inventory. Four different Abrams variants, along with the M60 fleet, would approximate
the logistical challenge faced by the German Army during World War II as it supported
an armored force with a multitude of armored platforms, each with many variants.
Again, this expanded logistical tail to support 272 M1A2 tanks will probably result in
higher O&M costs.
The majority of the armor force will have MIAl tanks which in the past
have been difficult to transport and recover due to their 67 ton weight using the existing
Heavy Equipment Transporters (HET) and M88-series tracked recovery vehicles. The
M1A2 will weigh 68.5 tons which makes HET transportability and tank recovery more
difficult. This will require faster deployment of new generation support vehicles to
support the 272 M1A2s that will be in the armor force.
d. Trining and Doctiine
If production terminates after 272 M1A2 tanks are fielded to the U.S.
Army, questions to consider are how efficient will it be to train tank crewmen to operate
a relatively unique system? Will a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Additional
Skill Identifier (ASI) be required for M1A2 crewmen and maintenance personnel (turret
mechanics)? How will doctrine and tactics be rewritten to incorporate the superior C3
and fire control capabilities of the tank since these capabilities will exponentially increase
the commander's ability to quickly develop the battle utilizing the Commander's
Integrated Display (CID)? These questions mean that the small percentage of the armor
force will be trained on the M1A2 and that a transition program will have to be
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established by the Armor School in Fort Knox, Kentucky, to train personnel being
assigned to MIA2 equipped units.
An additional issue to consider with the small number of deployed
M1A2s is the number of Unit-Conduct-of-Fire Trainers (UCOFT) tank simulators that
will be required for each M1A2 battalion. To purchase one for each battalion plus an
additional one at the Armor School will add up to five or six simulators for the Army.
At these low rates, per unit costs of each simulator and required contractor support will
probably be much higher than if a larger M1A2 force were fielded.
e. Foreign Military Sales
The lack of conmitment to tank uroduction by the U.S. erodes the FMS
business base because production termination also adds to the per unit costs for FMS.
This would motivate foreign customers to seek out other types of tanks, resulting in
further degradation to the tank industrial base as the business base is eroded. Japan,
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are already entering production for domestic
and foreign customers with new model tanks which would take potential business away
from the U.S.
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2. OPTION TWO: The Army should reduce production to the minimum
production rate th3t will keep the factory operational until the factory
retools for the next generation tank.
This option is based on a trickle production rate which sustains a minimal
production process, critical equipment and skills and provides for an orderly expansion
to full-rate production in an emergency.
a. Force Mix and Structure
This option is similar to Option One in that trickle rate production of the
M1A2 would eventually reach numbers similar to production termination in 1995.
Again, the force mix and structure would be marginally impacted by the addition of 272
M1A2 tanks to the armor force because these 272 tanks would only comprise 3.3 percent
of all tanks in the inventory. These M1A2s would equip five armor battalions of 58
tanks each or roughly 1.5 heavy divisions. These numbers do not account for tanks that
would be required for overseas prepositioning, maintenance float vehicles, and training
tanks for the Armor School, etc. As in Option One, the actual deployable numbers in
the field would even be lower.
As in Option One, the Army has implicitly designated the 2164 Ml
105mm Abrams tanks as a tank of last resort. The next war will probably see few if any
Ml or MIEP tanks in combat with the preponderance of the armor force being MIAls.
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b. Technological Superiority
Although this option preserves the industrial base in its current
configuration, thiý implies that the leading units of the armor force will continue to
possess tanks based on 1970's technology that are being matched or exceeded by
potential adversaries. This would violate the Army's modernization strategy be,.ause
potential adversaries would have a superior weapon system compared to that of the U.S.
Examples of this technological gap abound as the U.S. Government has approved the sale
of M1A2s to various nations to include Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and perhaps the United
Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Canada and Pakistan.
c. Logistical Support Requirements
The force mix given production slowdown could eventually reach the mix
attained in the production termination force mix, (Table XV) concluding the first phase
in the reconversion program. This mix would require a spare parts and maintenance base
for 272 or fewer M1A2s in the Army's inventory, most likely contributing to higher
overall O&M costs. The spare parts demand for such a small number of systems would
probably be difficult to track especially if the tanks were geographically scattered across
the United States or overseas. It would also place a burden on industry as they would
be required to produce small amounts of spares at less than economical rates, with costs
being passed on to D in d further eroding the subcontractor base. As in Option One,
the weight of the M1A2 will force the Army to accelerate the deployment of new
generation HET and recovery vehicles to support the tank.
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d. Training and Doctrine
As was described in Option One, if production terminates after 272
M1A2 tanks are fielded to the U.S. Army, questions to consider are how efficient will
it be to train tank crewmen to operate a relai',ely unique system, especially when tanks
are being fielded at much slower rates due to trickle rate production?
Again, because of the small numbers of MIA2s in the armor force, fewer
crewmen and mechanics will have to be trained on the tank, only selected officers would
be taught M1A2 specific doctrine and tactics, and small numbers of UCOFT tank
simulators procured. Such minimal amounts of support will most likely be at less than
economical rates.
e. Foreign Military Sales
As in Option One, the lack of commitment by the U.S. to tank
production erodes the FMS business base because production termination adds to the per
unit costs for FMS sales. This would motivate foreign customers to seek out other types
of tanks, resulting in further degradation to the tank industrial base as the business base
is eroded. Japan, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are already entering
production for domestic and foreign customers with new model tanks which would take
potential business away from the U.S.
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3. OPTION THREE: The Army should complete production of the M1A1
tank and then use the factory to retrofit/upgrade older model tanks to
the M1A2.
This option bridges the MI/MIA1 to the Block III or Future Main Battle
Tank (FMBT) by incorporating emerging technologies into the M1A2 or Block II tank.
It is a cost effective option because at two-thirds the cost of a brand new M1A2, an older
tank is converted into the most technologically advanced tank in the world.
a. Force Mix and Structure
Table XV depicts the force mix under the full retrofit program. The bulk
of the armor force would consist of MI Al s and MIA2s, simplifying logistics since larger
numbers of M1A2s would now be in the inventory and easier to track and manage. This
force mix also gives the Army the necessary firepower to counter existing threats.
b. Technological Superiority
This option incorporates leap-ahead technologies that overmatch any
potential adversary and most importantly, gives the soldier a technological advantage
over a potentially numerous foe. This option is in line with the Army's modernization
strategy and at the same time preserves the tank industrial base.
c. Logistical Supporl Requirements
This mix would require a spare parts and maintenance base for 1064
M1A2 tanks under the full upgrade plan presented in Table XV. This creates a larger
base for spares procurement, distribution and maintenance. It also allows industry to
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produce spares at economic orders of quantity (EOQ) and allows better tracking of parts
through the supply system. Again, four different Abrams variants, along with the M60
fleet, would still give Army quartermasters and ordnance personnel a major logistical
challenge since so many parts between tank variants are incompatible.
Other aspects to consider are the MIA2's weight, which requires
improved HET and maintenance/recovery vehicle capabilities. The Ml weighs 60 tons,
the MIAI weighs 67 tons, and the MIA2 weighs 68.5 tons. The Army's ability to
transport tanks long distances and recover them in the battlefield was already identified
as a serious shortcoming during Desert Shield/Storm. Under this option, the higher mix
of MiAls and MlA2s equates to more tanks with greater weight in the armor force.
Therefore, priority will have to be given to speeding up the development and fielding of
the HET capabilities for these weapon systems.
d. Training and Doctrine
From a training and doctrine standpoint, new tactics will be required
incorporating the M1A2's superior fire control system and command, control
communications capabilities (C3).8" Additional operations and support costs will have
to be dedicated to training the tank crewmen and maintenance personnel required to
operate and maintain the M1A2 since the M1A1 and MIA2 are technologically a
generation apart. Along with the fielding of MIA2s, the UCOFT and other tank crew
simulators will be required to support training on the weapon system.
"
81Neil Munro, "'Kick-ass Tank,' M1A2 Struts Stuff at NTC But Glitches Plague
Debut," Army Times, 5 October 1992, p. 35.
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e. Foreign Military Sales
The approved sale of MIA2s to various countries would in some cases
assure system compatibility with U.S. systems, particularly in the Middle East. Per unit
costs of FMS tanks are also lowered, since production of U.S. and foreign tanks now
takes place, distributing overhead across a greater number of tanks in production.
C. SUMMARY
From an operational effectiveness approach, the best option is to continue the full
retrofit program for the MIA2 tank (Option Three). This gives the higher percentage
of MIA2s (13.1 percent) to the armor force with the majority of the fleet possessing the
MIAI (58.9 percent). This is a much better force mix than that of Options One and
Two. With 13.1 percen he armor force possessing a tank with advanced technology,
the Army's front-line units will have a decisive technological advantage over any enemy
on the battlefield.
Logistics support will be easier to manage for a larger fleet than for a smaller fleet
of tanks. Additionally, utilization of MI Abrams tanks for reconversion results in fewer
older tanks in the force. This equates to lower operations and maintenance costs to
support first-generation tanks. The major disadvantage of Option Three is that to support
the 1064 MIA2s in the fleet, priority will have to be given to deploying new generation
HET and tracked maintenance recovery vehicles to support the tanks. Without this, the
MIA2 will be hindered by a lack of adequate transport and recovery capability.
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In some cases, approved FMS of MlA2s to various countries would result in
system compatibility with U.S. systems, simplifying combat logistics. This is especially
applicable in the Middle East.
In conclusion, continued retrofit to the MIA2 will give operational commanders
a decisive technological edge over any enemy while preserving the tank industrial base.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The tank industrial base is unique and essential to the readiness of the U.S. Army.
There is no commercial counterpart. The world is becoming more unstable and the need
for U.S. peacekeeping strength is greater than ever. To let the tank industrial base
whither due to an unclear industrial base plan is to compromise future readiness, tank
program options, and U.S. resolve to support its allies.
In the FY93 DOD budget, Congress appropriated $161 million to upgrade 210
older MI 105mm tanks to the M1A2. With the addition of the $197.4 million obtained
from the sale of tanks from the Army inventory in FY91/92 and the $225 million
appropriated in FY92, the survival of the tank industrial base through at least 1995 seems
secure". As stated in a recently published Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study,
"the Congress opted to insure against possible future threats to U.S. security by
sustaining most of the tank industrial base."83
From a cost effectiveness analysis, the recommended option for preserving the tank
industrial base is Option Three (Full Upgrade). The challenge now lies in obtaining the
"
82U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Department of Defense Appropriations
Bill, 1993, Report 102-627 to Accompany H.R. 5504, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 29
June 1992, p. 86.
"
83U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, "Alternatives For The U.S. Tank
Industrial Base," A CBO Study, February 1993, p. 36.
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three billion dollars necessary to complete the second phase of the reconversion program,
the retrofit of an additional 792 tanks to the M1A2, scheduled to take place between
1996-1999. At the conclusion of the retrofit program in 1999, a total of 1064 M1A2
tanks could be part of the armor force.
B. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions summarize the advantages and disadvantages of each of
the three options for preserving the tank industrial base within the scope of this thesis.
This summary is followed by a comparative analysis of the three options.
1. Summary of Options for Preserving the Tank Industrial Base
The following three options are among several that DOD, Congress, and
industry have proposed and will continue to be debated in the coming years.
a. OPTION ONE: The Army should mothball the Lima, Ohio tank plant
after the last Abrams tank is built.
This plan would include a complete layaway of Lima Army Tank Plant
(LATP), extensive employee layoffs and tank production termination after the first phase
of the M1A2 retrofit is completed in 1995. The industrial facilities utilized by General
Dynamics-Land Systems Division (GDLS) would be retained and equipment stored in
place. Advantages of executing this option are that:
"* There are over 8000 Abrams tanks in the Army inventory, so the military does not
require any more tanks.
"* Current FMS and the Heavy Vehicle Assault Bridge program will provide enough
work to sustain the tank industrial base.
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"* Phase I of the retrofit program links the M1A2 to the Future Main Battle Tank
(FMBT), sustaining the design, development, production expertise and Abrams
program experience through at least 1995.
"* The MIAI is fully capable of maintaining its role as the most lethal tank in the
world based on the Desert Storm experience. Therefore, more M1A2's beyond
1995 are not needed.
Disadvantages of executing this option are that:
"* Upon closure, the tank industrial base will permanently lose the design,
development, production expertise and Abrams program experience.
"* Closure costs are estimated at $569.4 million with an additional one billion dollars
required to restart production from total layaway.
"* After Phase I of the retrofit program is completed, spare parts prices will increase
between 50 and 75 percent of the original price.
"* After closure, the ability to expand in an emergency under surge or mobilization
scenarios will be critically hampered.
"* The Army's modernization strategy is nonexistent with a cold tank production base.
"* Upon closure, industry will be unable to refine its production processes through the
maintenance of a warm production base.
"* Upon closure, the majority of subcontractors will permanently exit tank production.
"* Various foreign countries will possess the M1A2, while the majority of U.S. forces
will possess the MIAL
"* The uncertainty surrounding the development, production and fielding of the Future
Main Battle Tank (FMBT) could potentially leave U.S. forces with the Abrams for
the next twenty or more years.
"* Closure will terminate depleted uranium armor production for the Abrams tank
which significantly enhances crew survivability.
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b. OPTION TWO: The Anny should reduce production to the minimum
production rate that will keep the factory operational until the factory
retools for the next generation tank.
This option is based on a trickle production rate which sustains a minimal
production process, critical equipment and skills and provides for an orderly expansion
to full-rate production in an emergency. Advantages of executing this option are that:
"* Phase I of the retrofit program links the MIA2 to the Future Main Battle Tank
(FMBT), sustaining the design, development, production expertise and Abrams
program experience through at least 1995.
"* The retrofit program maintains the repair parts supply base and gives DOD the
ability to expand in an emergency under surge or mobilization scenarios for the
near-term.
"* The MI conversion program allows the Army to support an ongoing modernization
strategy in a cost effective manner through the execution of technology insertions
into an existing weapon system.
"* The continuation of the retrofit program allows industry to refine its productionprocesses through the maintenance of a warm production base with improved
technology upgrades on the assembly line.
"* The retrofit program preserves U.S. capabilities to produce depleted uranium armor
for the Abrams tank which will significantly enhance crew survivability.
Disadvantages of executing Option Two are that:
"* It is a short-term solution to preserving the tank industrial base.
" Trickle rate production or production stretchout will steadily erode the tank
industrial base, especially at the second- and third-tier subcontractor level as less
than anticipated production rates force vendors out of tank component production.
"* There are over 8000 Abrams tanks in the Army in, entory, so the military does not
require any more tanks.
I
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0 Current FMS and Heavy Vehicle Assault Bridge program will provide enough
work to sustain the tank industrial base.
0 The MIAl is fully capable of maintaining its role as the most lethal tank in the
world based on the Desert Storm experience, therefore the M1A2 is not needed
beyond 1995.
c. OPTION THREE: The Army should complete production of the MIA]
tank and then use the factory to retrofit/upgrade older model tanks to
the MIA2.
This option bridges the M1/M1A1 to the Block III or Future Main Battle
Tank (FMBT) by incorporating emerging technologies into the M1A2 or Block II tank.
It is a cost effective option because at two-thirds the cost of a brand new M1A2, an older
tank is converted into the most technologically advanced tank in the world. Advantages
of executing this option are that:
"* The continuation of the retrofit program links the M I A2 to the Future Main Battle
Tank (FMBT) sustaining the design, development, production expertise and
Abrams program experience.
"* The retrofit program maintains the repair parts supply base and gives DOD the
ability to expand in an emergency under surge or mobilization scenarios.
"* The M I conversion program allows the Army to support an ongoing modernization
strategy in a cost effective manner through the execution of technology insertions
into an existing weapon system.
"* The continuation of the retrofit program allows industry to refine its production
processes through the maintenance of a warm production base with improved
technology upgrades on the assembly line.
"* The retrofit program preserves U.S. capabilities to produce depleted uranium armor
for the Abrams tank which will significantly enhance crew survivability.
Disadvantages of executing Option Three are that:
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"* The overall program costs are estimated at four billion dollars. Therefore, it will
be difficult to fund given the current budget climate.
"* There are over 8000 Abrams tanks in the Army inventory, so the military does not
require any more tanks.
"* Current FMS and the Heavy Vehicle Assault Bridge program will provide enough
work to sustain the tank industrial base.
"* The MlAI is fully capable of maintaining its role as the most lethal tank in the
world based on the Desert Storm experience, therefore the M1A2 is not needed
beyond 1995.
2. Comparative Analysis
Utilizing a decision matrix to compare the three options, conclusions are
attained based on the following criteria. Operational effectiveness, discussed in Chapter
VII, included factors such as: (1) force mix and structure, (2) technological superiority,
(3) logistical support requirements, (4) training and doctrine, and (5) Foreign Military
Sales (FMS). Costs, discussed in Chapter IV, included factors such as: (1) facility
layaway, (2) human resources, (3) equipment layaway, (4) equipment removal, (5) close
out penalty, and (6) maintenance/caretaker costs. A relative factor ranking of both the
operational effectiveness and cost factors is contained in Table XVI. It should be noted
that the relative rankings indicate which option is deemed better than another option only.




RELATIVE FACTOR RANKING MATRIX
Criteria/Factors Option One Option Two Option Three
COSTS
Facility Layaway 3 1 2
Human Resources 3 1 2
Equipment Layaway 3 1 2
Equipment Removal I 1 I
Close Out Penalty 1 I 1
Maintenance/Caretaker 3 1 2
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
Force Mix and Structure 2 3 1
Technological Superiority 2 3 1
Logistical Support Requirements 1 3 1
Training and Doctrine 2 3 1
Foreign Military Sales 2 3 1
The summary decision matrix depicted in Table XVII is a combined ranking
of all the cost and operational effectiveness factors compiled from Table XVI. Again,
a number one in the decision matrix reflects the best option in each category while a
number three reflects the worst option.
TABLE XVII
SUMMARY DECISION MATRIX
Option Costs Operational Effectiveness
OPTION ONE: Production Termination in 1995 3 2
OPTION TWO: Phase I Upgrade at Trickle Rates 1 3
OPTION THREE: Full Upgrade (Phase I & H1) 2 1
From a cost and operational effectiveness approach, the preferred option to
take for preserving the industrial base is to continue the full retrofit program for the
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M1A2 tank (Option Three). It would initially cost an estimated $154.1 million" to
rollover to MIA2 production in 1993. By completion of the initial reconversion in 1995,
this dollar amount will have become a sunk cost and for $1.4 billion the Army will
possess 272 M1A2 tanks.
Option One, total production termination, is not a cost effective option.
Shutting down tank production at a cost of $569.4 million and restart at a cost of $1
billion is in excess of the cost required to continue production t,'ildr Option Two or
Option Three."5 In the event of a surge requirement, the cost to surge from termination
would be $1.013 billion if the Depleted Uranium (DU) facility has been closed for two
or more years or $948 million if the DU facility has been closed for less than two years.
Trickle rate production, as exemplified in Option Two, is less cost effective
than Option Three but more cost effective than Option One. But the main concern is that
a minimum production rate would increase per unit costs of the tank due to allocation of
overhead to fewer weapon systems. It would force some vendors out of business if this
production rate became inefficient.
By sustaining the tank industrial base under Option Three, a highly skilled
and experienced workforce is retained and an established subcontractor base remains in
place. The flexibility remains to execute responsive production surges while supporting
the existing armor force with a warm tank industrial base. More importantly, DOD
"uU.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command, Abrams Program Closure Study (Austere),
Warren, MI: Unpublished Slides, 13 August 1991, Slide VC 13.
"
85TACOM, Abrams Program Closure Study (Austere), Slide VC 10.
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keeps the option to use the reconversion program as a bridge for the U.S. Army's next
generation tank.
Under all options, the total armor force will stand at 8132 Abrams tanks but
the Option which reflects the most lethal force mix is Option Three. In Option Three,
the Army will maintain an Abrams tank force that consists of 59 percent MlAI and 13
percent M1A2 tanks. This is a superior force mix compared to Options One and Two.
Continued MlA2 conversions incorporate the latest technologies that give the Army a
technological advantage over any threat. The continued conversion of older tanks to the
MIA2 also supports the DOD and the Army modernization strategy which calls for
existing platform upgrades as opposed to new system starts. The more balanced mix of
MiAls and M1A2s will make it easier for DOD and the Army to support the tank fleet
logistically as compared to Options One and Two. In conclusion, continued retrofit to
the M1A2 will sustain a unique industrial base while giving operational commanders a
decisive technological edge over any enemy. Within the scope of this thesis, the
preferred solution for preserving the tank industrial base after 1995 is to continue the
M1A2 retrofit program.
3. Additional Conclusions
Based on the research conducted, the following additional conclusions also
impact the ability of the tank industrial base to survive through the drawdown and remain
viable in the future.
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a. Foreign Militaiy Sales
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is an effective way of protecting the
industrial base and reducing per unit costs to both the Army and U.S. allies. It also
bridges gaps that might be created with uneven domestic tank production due to program
instability in the budget cycle. It facilitates interoperability with U.S. allies since they
will have similar systems in their inventory. The FMS program to allies should be
pursued as a matter of military, foreign, and industrial policy at levels similar to the
French or British support of their respective defense industries.
b. Regulatory Requirements
The problems generated by the declining defense budget are exacerbated
by the regulations and practices associated with doing business with DOD. Furthermore,
"these practices increase the cost of military systems by adding as much as 25 to 50
percent to unit costs and procurement time. "' By adopting commercial standards
through actions such as converting military specifications to non-governmental standards,
adnpting European vendor standards (ISO 9000) for supplier accreditation and adopting
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) standards, some of the costly reviews and audits
mandated by current government regulations are eliminated and overhead and duplication
of effort reduced.
"
86U.S. Congress, Structure of the Industrial Base Panel of the CGmmittee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, Future of the Defense Industrial Base, Report No.




The Government should continue to track and gauge the health of the
second- and third- tier tank subcontractor base as the defense industry in general
continues to shrink. Small businesses at the second- and third-tier levels are an integral
part of technology innovation and the principal source of new jobs."7 The Government
needs to focus its attention not only on prime contractors, but the subcontractor base as
well, in order to monitor the health of the tank industrial base.
d. Depleted Uranium Production
Current regulations forbid the sale of tanks with depleted uranium (DU)
armor to all foreign countries. The Government should consider selling DU armor
equipped tanks to selected allies if it believes that these sales will preserve the DU
facility, its workforce, and manufacturing processes while not compromising national
security.
e. Total Quality Management
The DOD's posture on quality states that a quality and productivity
oriented defense industry is the key to DOD's ability to maintain a superior level of
readiness. It further states that the emphasis must change from relying on inspection, to
designing and building quality into the process and product. By incorporating Total
Quality Management (TQM) into tank and tank component manufacture, the elapsed time
required to perform test and evaluation procedures for tank components, which can last
"
87U.S. Congress, Future of the Defense Industrial Base, p. 15.
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several years in some cases, will be considerably shortened. Department of Defense test
and evaluation procedures preclude further activities by firms such as full scale
development until the component is accepted by DOD. By building in quality on the
factory floor, the need for a lengthy and costly test and evaluation process is eliminated.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Within the scope of this thesis, the following recommendations are made that will
ensure the long-term preservation of the tank industrial base.
1. General Recommendations
It is recommended that the second phase of the MIA2 retrofit program
continue from 1996-1999 as the best course of action to maintain technological
superiority, preserve the industrial base, and keep future options open to decisionmakers.
2. Specific Recommendations
Additional recommendations include:
"* Increase governmental support of FMS.
"* Relax regulatory requirements for contractors doing business with DOD.
"* Closely track the subcontractor base during the restructuring process.
"* Sell DU armor equipped tanks to selected allies as long as it does not threaten
national security.
"* Support TQM at all levels of the tank industrial base.
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3. Recommendations for Further Research
Recommended areas for further study discussed in Chapter U may affect the
options available to decisionmakers for preserving the tank industrial base and should be
thoroughly examined, especially after this current round of restructuring. Research
should be conducted to answer the following questions:
"* Defense conversion: Can GDLS and tank subcontractors successfully transition
from tank production to commercial ventures, and if so, would they be able or
willing to return to tank production?
"* Reconstitution: Can the tank industrial base reconstitute itself after a major
downsizing in future years?
"* Dual-use technologies: Can dual-use technologies be used to ease the transition
from commercial production to tank component manufacture?
"* Flexible manufacturing: As the production center for the Abrams tank and various
other platforms built on the Abrams chassis, is it cost effective to consolidate all
tracked vehicle production at Lima Army Tank Plant (LATP)?
"* War reserve requirements: Realizing the costs to maintain inventory and physical
and technological obsolescence of parts on hand, how can supply activities maintain
an adequate war reserve stock of tank parts in order to avoid the taking of
components slated for new tank production as evidenced during Desert
Shield/Storm?
"* Foreign investment in U.S. tank production capability: What is the level of foreign
investment allowable in U.S. tank production or is government oversight on foreign
investment in defense industries nonexistent? Should existing regulations be
reviewed for applicability and streamlining?
* Work allocation between Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) and Army
depots: How should tank industrial capacity be divided between OEM and depot
organizations given the requirement to dismantle MI tanks in preparation for the
retrofit process?
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These areas have varying degrees of significance for the tank industrial base. They
all require further study to specifically assess their impact on preserving future U.S. tank
production capability.
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APPENDIX A: ABRAMS TANK PRODUCTION, 1980-1993
MI Abrams: 2374
"* 105mm gun with muzzle reference sensor
"* NBC filtration system
"* Chobham armor
"* Compartmentahzed fuel and ammunition for crew protection
"* Halon fire extinguisher system
"* Digital ballistic computer
"* Miniaturized laser rangefinder
"* Thermal imaging system for day/night all-weather capability
"* Enhanced suspension system
"* AGT1500 gas turbine engine with Hydrokinetic transmission
"* Modular engine design
"* Onboard malfunction detection system
"* Weight: 60 tons
MI Abrams Improved Product (MIIP): 894
"* Stretch turret
"• Enhanced frontal armor protection
"* Weight: 60 tons
MIAI Abrams: 4802
"* 120mm gun with improved muzzle reference sensor
"* NBC overpressure system which seals crew compartment for 2.6 psi overpressure
"* Enhanced fire control system and digital ballistic computer
"• Hull and turret ammunition compartment changes for 120mm ammunition
"• Depleted uranium armor
"• CARC paint
"* Weight: 67 tons
MlA2 Abrams: 62
"• SINCGARS radio with Radio Interface Unit (RIU)
"* Data bus coupler
"* Analog input module
"* Commander's independent thermal viewer (CITV) and integrated display
"• Survivability enhancements
"• Modified turret platform
"• Fire control electronics unit
"* Positional/navigational system
"• Improved commander's weapons station
"* Improved fire control system
"* Improved suspension system
"* Improved gunner's control display panel
"* Improved hull and turret electronics units
"• Driver's integrated display and thermal viewer




The following definitions are from the Defense Systems Management College
manual, Integrating Industrial Preparedness Into The Acquisition Process.
1. Industrial Plant Equipment (IPE)
Industrial plant equipment is equipment used for the purpose of cutting,
abrading, grinding, shaping, forming, joining, testing, measuring, heating, treating, or
otherwise altering the physical, electrical, or chemical properties of materials,
components, or end items entailed in manufacturing, maintenance, supply, processing,
assembly, or research and development operations.
2. Other Plant Equipment (OPE)
Other plant equipment is that which is used in or with the manufacture of
components or end items for maintenance, supply, processing, assembly or research and
development operation; but excluding items categorized as IPE.
3. Special Test Equipment (STE)
Special test equipment consists of multipurpose integrated test units
engineered, designed, fabricated, or modified to accomplish special-purpose testing in
the performance of the contract. Such testing units comprise electrical, electronic,
hydraulic, pneumatic, mechanical, or other items or assemblies of equipment that are
mechanically, electrically, or electronically interconnected to become a new functional
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entity, causing the individual item or items to become interdependent and essential in the
performance of special-purpose testing. Special test equipment does not include material,
special tooling, and plant equipment items used for general plant testing purposes.
4. Special Tooling (ST)
Special tooling consists of all jigs, dies, fixtures, molds, patterns, taps,
gauges, other equipment, and manufacturing aids that are of such a specielized nature
that, without substantial modification or alteration, their use is limited to the development
or production of particular supplies or parts. Special tooling does not include material,
STE, buildings, general machine tools, or similar capital items.
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APPENDIX C: M1A2 TANK COSTS
The following costs are estimated M1A2 specific unit costs as of February 1993.88
The costs exclude Non-Recurring (NR) costs, initial spares and training devices.
"* Newly Built Production M1A2 Tanks: The total Army procurement of
production MlA2 tanks (62) occurred in FY91. Deliveries are scheduled for
December 1992 through April 1993. The recurring Weapon System Unit cost
(WSUC) is $4.5 million.
"* Upgrade of M1A1 (Non-Depleted Uranium) Tank to M1A2: The upgrade of an
MIAI non-Depleted Uranium (DU) armor tank to an M1A2 has a recurring WSUC
of $3.2 million.
"* Upgrade of M1A1 (Depleted Uranium) Tank to M1A2: The upgrade of an
MIAI Depleted Uranium (DU) armor tank to an MIA2 has a recurring WSUC of
$2.9 million.
"* Upgrade of M1 105amm Tank to MlA2: The upgrade of an Ml 105mm tank to
an M1A2 has a recurring WSUC of $3.9 million. There will be 210 M1 tanks
upgraded to the M1A2 during Phase I of the upgrade program scheduled to be
procured in the FY93-94 time frame with deliveries scheduled in FY95-96.
Ij~
I
8 lThomas G. Zemke, Memorandum to the researcher from Program Executive
Office, Armored Systems Modernization, U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command, 19
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